Edith Wharton, Privacy, and Publicity by Bulman, Jessica
Edith Wharton, Privacy, and Publicity
Jessica Bulmant
I. INTRODUCTION
"It's the woman's soul, absolutely torn up by the roots-her whole self laid
bare .... I don't mean to read another line; it's too much like listening at a
keyhole."' When Mrs. Touchett speaks these words in Edith Wharton's early
novella, The Touchstone, we may wonder whether Wharton is mocking her
own voyeuristic readership and grappling with her tenuous privacy as a
professional female author. Despite her protestations, Mrs. Touchett has
relished reading the letters of Mrs. Aubyn, a deceased novelist whose former
lover, Stephen Glennard, has published her correspondence. It is precisely
because these love letters (or "unloved letters' '2 as Mrs. Touchett characterizes
them) promise to reveal the private truth of a woman's life that they have
become such a sensational bestseller. Perhaps avenging the version of herself
that is Mrs. Aubyn, Wharton refuses to show her own readers the published
letters, but she has sparked our curiosity, which instead clings to Glennard's
life, or even to Wharton's. Indeed, The Touchstone presciently anticipates
questions of privacy, publicity, and personality that would underlie Wharton's
mature fiction, her interpersonal relationships, and her very conception of
herself. By probing these issues through the lens of an author's intimate
correspondence, she both gestures to her own concerns about privacy as a
female writer and enters a raging legal debate launched a decade earlier.
In 1890 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published The Right to
Privacy,3 one of the most influential legal articles ever written. Maintaining the
need to protect human dignity from invasive prying, the two lawyers advanced
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1. Edith Wharton, The Touchstone, 27 SCRIBNER'S MAG. 354, 370 (1900).
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3. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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an argument for a right to privacy, and they invoked intellectual property cases
to articulate and ground this right. Wharton's mapping of letters and privacy
concerns, then, echoes not only Henry James's 1888 The Aspern Papers-
which involves a similar, though thwarted, effort to publish letters that lie at the
intersection of authorial fame and personal romancea--but also this legal
discussion. Turning in particular to cases concerning authors' prepublication
rights, Warren and Brandeis argue that the individual has the right to determine
"to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated
to others," 5 and they note, "[t]he same protection is accorded to a casual letter
or an entry in a diary and to the most valuable poem or essay.",6 For Warren and
Brandeis, written works were at once literary property and expressions of the
self.
Consequently, a notable aspect of The Right to Privacy is a tension
between protecting privacy as a species of property and protecting privacy as a
necessary condition of personality. Perhaps motivated by John Locke's
treatment of property as alienable and life as inalienable,7 Warren and Brandeis
attempt to cast privacy in terms of selfhood rather than property. They insist,
"[t]he principle which protects personal writings... against publication in any
form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate
personality,",8 and they champion "the more general right to the immunity of
the person-the right to one's personality."9 Despite this use of copyright to
withstand conceptions of privacy as property and to resist the market's
commercialization of private information,' ° Warren and Brandeis never fully
circumvent the property framework that defmed rights in late nineteenth-
century and early twentieth-century American law.1' They proceed to discuss
not only literary expression, but also one's personality in terms of ownership:
"The right of property in its widest sense, including all possession, including all
rights and privileges, and hence embracing the right to an inviolate personality,
affords alone that broad basis upon which the protection which the individual
demands can be rested."'
12
4. HENRY JAMES, THE ASPERN PAPERS (Penguin Books 1986) (1888).
5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 198.
6. Id. at 199.
7. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690).
8. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 205.
9. Id. at 207.
10. See BROOK THOMAS, AMERICAN LITERARY REALISM AND THE FAILED PROMISE OF CONTRACT
59(1997).
11. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 151 (1992)
(emphasizing the discourse of property rights and arguing that "during the 1880s and 1890s...
American courts came as close as they ever had to saying that one had a property right to an unchanging
world"); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
12. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 211. See Walter Benn Michaels, The Contracted Heart,
21 NEW LITERARY HIST. 495, 526 n. 13 (1990) (arguing that Warren and Brandeis's "explicit attempt to
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In The Touchstone, Wharton extends this argument to its logical
conclusion. Exploiting the tension between property and personality, she
reverses Warren and Brandeis's logic. Property rights serve not to protect Mrs.
Aubyn's private personality, but to transform the author herself into a
commodity. The organic relationship the lawyers posit between writer and text
does not guard literary expression from unwanted publication, but instead turns
the writer into a text vulnerable to public consumption. As the novella begins,
Glennard overlooks Mrs. Aubyn's name in the newspaper because it has "long
been public property,"' 3 and we quickly learn that the public's possession
extends beyond her name. Wharton repeatedly emphasizes the loss of self-
ownership that successful authorship can effect. By writing popular novels,
Mrs. Aubyn has become a personage and ceased to be a person,' 4 and the
public claims ownership of her: "A personality as big as Margaret Aubyn's
belongs to the world.' 5 She effectively has lost both the right to her personality
and the right to privacy.
At the beginning of her own career, Wharton no doubt worried about
extemalizing, and potentially alienating, her identity in a published text,
especially as late nineteenth-century biographical and journalistic practices
presented authors' personalities as objects of legitimate mass consumption, and
readers clamored for information about these public figures.' 6 In The
Touchstone, Wharton criticizes the construction of the popular author as public
property. "[U]nlike the authors who give their essence to the public and keep
only a dry rind for their friends," Mrs. Aubyn, we learn, carefully erected a
barrier between her public and private selves and allowed only the former to be
commercially traded.1 7 Whereas she distinguished the letters she intended for
intimate acquaintances from the novels she published, Glennard dismantles the
shift privacy away from property nonetheless produced a dramatic extension of property rights,
produced, in effect, new property.").
13. Wharton, The Touchstone, supra note 1, at 354.
14. Id. at 359.
15. Id. at 370.
16. See, e.g., RICHARD SALMON, HENRY JAMES AND THE CULTURE OF PUBLICITY 79 (1997). See
also JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY
INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 14-36, 79-117 (Thomas Burger trans., 1992) (discussing
how the bourgeois political theory of the eighteenth century considered publicity essential to the
construction of a critical public that would expose the private interests of monarchy and aristocracy).
Notably, Warren and Brandeis's "right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of
public or general interest," for, they argue, certain people "have renounced the right to live their lives
screened from public observation." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 214-15. Still today, the right
of the public to know certain information is often protected over individuals' privacy. For discussions
of the conflict between privacy rights and the First Amendment, see Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of
Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329 (1979); Bruce E. H. Johnson, The
Battle over Internet Privacy and the First Amendment, 18 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 21 (2001); Solveig
Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.,
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97 (2000); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Information Privacy, and the
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking about You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049
(2000).
17. Wharton, The Touchstone, supra note 1, at 360.
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boundary between these two forms of literary expression and transforms her
personal sentiments into property. His publication exploits Mrs. Aubyn's
distinction, for the private voice of her epistles is precisely what makes them so
popular. When Mrs. Touchett pronounces the letters unreadable, she ironically
underscores the value of the volume. It is because reading the letters is like
listening at a keyhole that a mass audience devours them. Glennard's
publication not only commodifies Mrs. Aubyn's letters, but also her person.
The public may have claimed ownership of this "famous shrine"18 before her
letters were published, but it lacked intimate information about her; it is
Glennard's act that allows readers to imaginatively possess Mrs. Aubyn's life.19
In "Copy," a satiric dialogue Wharton published two months after The
Touchstone, the female author self-consciously gives her "essence to the
public., 20 Throughout her dialogue with Ventnor, a famous poet who was once
her lover, Mrs. Dale suggests that her private personality is a mere residue of
her public persona. She calls herself "a figment of the reporter's brain-a
monster manufactured out of newspaper paragraphs, with ink in its veins' 2' and
states that the "last shred of [her] identity" is in public keeping. 22 Despite her
dramatic complaint, it is clear that she enjoys being popularly owned and can
only think of herself in terms of her public persona. Her very lament is a
theatrical presentation that at once informs Ventnor's image of her and her own
sense of self. Unlike Mrs. Aubyn, who carefully withheld her private self from
publicity, Mrs. Dale raises the possibility that publicity may underlie the female
author's only self. In "Copy" Wharton challenges Warren and Brandeis's
fundamental idea of an inviolate personality, for Mrs. Dale, it seems, has no
private personality beyond the public's conception of her, a conception that she
has informed but does not control.
Perhaps this is why, like Warren and Brandeis, Mrs. Dale appears to be
confused about whether her letters to Ventnor are property or expressionz of
her inmost personality. She passionately claims that she owns the letters
because they are outpourings of private emotions, but later reveals a more
sordid profit motive: She wants to publish the correspondence in her memoirs.
While it would be easy to discount her declaration of personal interest as a
ploy, both of Mrs. Dale's claims resonate; she believes at once that the letters
18. Id. at 350.
19. If publishing letters makes private information public property in The Touchstone, it also,
paradoxically, returns public information to the private realm. Glennard appreciates the intimacy of
Mrs. Aubyn's correspondence only after he reads pages of the published volume. Threatened by public
appropriation, letters that had long lost their private meaning for him regain their personal significance.
Looking at a random page in the published volume, he winces: "Why had he included that one among
the others? Or was it possible that now they would all seem like that?" Wharton, The Touchstone,
supra note 1, at 485. As readers of The Touchstone, we recognize that they would all seem like that; in
the light of publicity, the contours of privacy emerge more clearly.
20. Wharton, The Touchstone, supra note 1, at 360.
21. Edith Wharton, "Copy": A Dialogue, 27 SCRIBNER'S MAG. 657, 658 (1900).
22. Id. at 659.
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represent her personality and that they would sell well, and her confusion of
private and public motives is so entrenched that she cannot differentiate
between them. To publish her memoirs would be to articulate her sense of self.
When she and Ventnor ultimately bum their correspondence, she watches
ambivalently-she has, perhaps, reclaimed part of her personality from the
greedy public, but she has also lost marketable material that would define her
private personality by amplifying her public persona.
Considered together, The Touchstone and "Copy" anticipate Wharton's
lifelong engagement with questions of personality, privacy, and publicity and
offer two competing views: Mrs. Aubyn's private personality that is threatened
by publicity and Mrs. Dale's public persona that is, in fact, her inmost self.
Throughout her own career, I will argue, Wharton negotiated a path between
the extremes of Mrs. Aubyn and Mrs. Dale by employing the very threat of
public exposure to forge a distinct private personality. Like Mrs. Dale, many of
Wharton's female characters depend on performance for their identities, so that
their senses of self reside in publicity. Wharton's own self-dramatizations
instead created a private identity that was dialectically related to publicity.
Ultimately, in her fictional and autobiographical works, Wharton illuminates
the complications of female privacy and inverts Warren and Brandeis's te-ms.
Whereas they posit an inviolate personality, she posits an interdependent self;
and whereas they champion "the right to be let alone," 23 she suggests that
privacy is only possible in the context of publicity.
In Part II of this Article, I explore the historical context of Wharton's
engagement with privacy. Beginning with a discussion of Warren and
Brandeis's The Right to Privacy, I examine the social and legal developments
that motivated their article, and the response to their proposed right to privacy.
Both a media-driven public sphere and the Victorian ideology of separate
spheres, I argue, influenced Warren and Brandeis, as they drew on legal
precedents for protecting information and the logic of domestic privacy in
crafting their argument. After discussing the implications of The Right to
Privacy for women and noting Wharton's place in turn-of-the-century
discussions of publicity and privacy, I consider in Part III two of Wharton's
most popular novels, The House of Mirth and The Custom of the Country, and
focus on the privacy of the novels' female protagonists. Lily Bart and Undine
Spragg define themselves through public displays and self-objectification, I
maintain, and publicity therefore precedes any sense of private identity the
women have. Wharton also, however, hints at a self that depends not on the
objectifying gaze of society, but rather on intimate companionship, and she
thereby suggests another possible way to forge an interdependent personality.
Both of these models of self-construction-self-objectification and
intimacy-were central to Wharton's own personality, and in Part IV of the
23. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195 (quoting Judge Thomas Cooley).
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paper I examine how Wharton fashioned her personality by engaging with
other people and literary texts. Drawing on her memoirs and diaries, I argue
that Wharton's sense of self depended on public representations and inhered in
a dynamic of exposure and creation. By threatening violation, publishing
paradoxically lent her a private identity. Finally, in Part V, I consider
Wharton's ambivalent relationship to her readership. She explicitly derides
mass consumption and casts readers as a threat to the novel's privacy by
gesturing to information beyond the text that we cannot access. At the same
time, she invites readers into an intimate relationship with herself and her
novels and casts us as sympathetic co-creators. The tension between these two
relationships with her readership, I argue, structures her novels and underscores
her complicated understanding of privacy.
Ultimately, the paper interrogates three different but related privacy
concerns: the privacy of fictional characters, the privacy of the author, and the
privacy of the text. In Part III, I take up the privacy of Wharton's female
characters and explore how the self-construction of Lily and Undine dramatizes
women's subjectivity at the turn of the century and reveals potential
shortcomings of a right to be let alone. As Wharton grappled with her
characters' privacy, she also had her own anxieties as a female author
publishing for a mass readership. In Part IV, I turn to the author's privacy and
discuss how Wharton's personality, forged largely through potentially violating
self-publication, illuminates authors' negotiations of privacy in the early
twentieth century. In Part V, I explore what might best be called textual
privacy. While Part III examines the privacy of characters within a fictional
world, Part V examines the privacy of these characters with regard to the reader
of the novel. Textual privacy encompasses not only the way the author exposes
characters to or shields them from readers, but also the larger privacy of the
novel, which implicates that of the author, and ultimately that of the reader as
well.
In her early works, The Touchstone and "Copy," Wharton grafts these
three different privacy concerns onto each other by using female writers as her
fictional protagonists. She explores Mrs. Aubyn's and Mrs. Dale's privacy as
both characters and authors, and further examines the textual privacy of these
women's works as they circulate in a fictional world. The Touchstone is also
instructive in considering textual privacy with respect to Wharton's reading
public. In the novella, Glennard experiences his violation of Mrs. Aubyn's
privacy as a violation of his own. As if undergoing one of Dante's contrapasso
punishments, he constantly imagines a "relentless human gaze, pressing close
upon [his] privacy. It was as though [he] sat in a brightly lit room, uncurtained
from a darkness full of hostile watchers. 24 Glennard's privacy is never actually
invaded in the novella, but his sense of being constantly observed is peculiarly
24. Wharton, The Touchstone, supra note 1, at 367.
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accurate, for he operates under the watchful eye of the reader. Wharton does
not merely record Glennard's shame and torment but is directly responsible for
his contrapasso punishment with regard to her own readership. This raises an
important question: Is Wharton's construction of her novella, with its telescopic
attention to Glennard's consciousness, the fictional equivalent of his publishing
Mrs. Aubyn's letters? If James's Aspern Papers dramatizes the prying
reader/critic and uncomfortably aligns the narrator's voyeurism regarding the
author with our own,25 Wharton's novella suggests the author's complicity in
invasions of privacy. Does she participate in the very sort of intrusion she
condemns? As readers, I will argue, we want to and should resist this charge,
but an appropriately nuanced understanding of how Wharton's literary works
position themselves with regard to privacy becomes possible only after
considering the historical context of her career and some of her other fictional
and autobiographical writings.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
Legend has it that Warren and Brandeis's The Right to Privacy grew not so
much out of sober legal discussion as Warren's heated clash with the Boston
press. According to Dean William Prosser, Warren, long frustrated with the
Boston newspapers' reporting of his wife's social functions, grew particularly
upset "when the newspapers had a field day on the occasion of the wedding of
a daughter. 26 While this account has since been discredited, it remains
instructive, for it places in a single narrative two discourses of privacy that
inform The Right to Privacy: On the one hand, concerns about informational
privacy generated by a voracious media and, on the other, an ideology of
domestic privacy that regarded the home as a haven sheltered from the public
marketplace. In the apocryphal wedding story, the press both publishes
information about an individual's private life and violates the sacred boundaries
of the home. The rather dramatic genesis of the article popularized by Dean
Prosser may be inaccurate, but it nonetheless cuts to the heart of Warren and
Brandeis's concerns.
25. See JAMES, supra note 4. See also SALMON, supra note 16; THOMAS, supra note 10.
26. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) (citing ALPHEUS T. MASON,
BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946)). Prosser argued that Warren's daughter must have been very
beautiful, since hers was "the face that launched a thousand lawsuits." Id. at 423.
27. Among other problems, Warren's daughter would have been six or seven years old when
Warren and Brandeis wrote the article. See LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 35 (1983); James Barron,
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark
Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 875, 893 (1979).
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A. Informational Privacy
The late nineteenth century was the age of "yellow journalism" in the
28United States. As the country industrialized, the press grew to meet the
demands of an exploding population of urban workers; the number of
newspapers almost doubled in the 1870s to roughly 7000 and climbed to
12,000 by 1890." Following the Civil War, publishers also revitalized the idea
of the penny press to enable mass circulation.30 Gossip columns overtook
political commentary,3' huge banner headlines boasted dramatic tales,3 2 and
colorful advertisements featured pictures of people surprised to suddenly fmd
themselves the public faces of products as diverse as flour, medicine, and life
insurance.33 The technological advances that made newspapers cheaper and
more eye-catching34 went hand-in-hand with sensationalistic media practices,
and the "palliative of sin, sex, and violence ''35 offered by "keyhole
journalism" 36 raised new fears about the tainting of public discourse and the
publication of personal information.
Warren and Brandeis leave no doubt that The Right to Privacy was, at least
in large part, a response to sensationalistic newspaper practices. They
complain,
[t]he press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and
vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well
28. See generally SIDNEY KOBRE, THE YELLOW PRESS AND GILDED AGE JOURNALISM (1964);
FRANK L. MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM, A HISTORY 1690-1960 (3d ed. 1962). See also Ken
Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIsc. L. REV. 1335 (discussing the impact of "yellow
journalism" on Warren and Brandeis and citing Kobre's and Mott's influential works).
29. MOTT, supra note 28, at41 1.
30. See KOBRE, supra note 28, at I (arguing that in the 1830s, during the first revolution in
American journalism, penny presses made newspapers cheaper and available to average citizens, and
during a second revolution following the Civil War, newspapers were massively popularized through
sensationalism and new technologies).
31. Before the Civil War, newspapers primarily served as appendages of local political parties.
MOTT, supra note 28, at 411-12.
32. New York World headlines included "A Bride but not a Wife" and "Baptised in Blood."
Gormley, supra note 28, at 1351 (quoting WILARD G. BLEYER, MAIN CURRENTS IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN JOURNALISM 328 (1927)).
33. See, e.g., Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (permitting use of
plaintiffs picture, without her consent, in a flour advertisement); Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs
Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (enjoining the unauthorized use of physician's signature in medicine
advertisement); Pavesich v. N.E. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (enjoining use of plaintiffs
picture, name, and fake endorsement in an insurance advertisement).
34. Among other developments were linotypes, fast presses, color printing, and instant
photography. Gormley, supra note 28, at 1351 (citing EDWIN EMERY & MICHAEL C. EMERY, THE
PRESS AND AMERICA: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE MASS MEDIA, 349-50 (3d ed. 1972)).
35. EMERY & EMERY, supra note 34, at 351.
36. MOTT, supra note 28, at 444 (discussing "keyhole journalism" and arguing that sensationalism
was closely connected to invasions of privacy by reporters).
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as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations
are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers.37
According to the lawyers, privacy was a peculiarly modem need. The
intensity and complexity of modem life had made people especially sensitive to
publicity, but as technological developments rendered privacy more desirable,
they also facilitated its invasion.38 This unfortunate paradox was not beyond
remedy, however, because technological advances posed a challenge that the
common law could grow to meet. 39 Framing their argument in response to
prying journalists and photographers, Warren and Brandeis insisted that the law
must respect individuals' right to be let alone by furnishing them with an
explicit right to privacy.
Warren and Brandeis were not the first scholars to seize upon privacy as a
modem necessity. As they note, their famous phrase, the right "to be let alone,"
came from Judge Thomas Cooley's The Law of Torts.40 They also acknowledge
their debt to an article on invasions of privacy published by E.L. Godkin in July
1890.41 Additionally, ten years earlier Godkin had remarked, in language
Warren and Brandeis would echo,
[n]othing is better worthy of legal protection than private life, or in
other words, the right of every man to keep his affairs to himself....
The press has no longer anything to fear from legal restriction of any
kind, as regards its influence or material prosperity; while the
community has a good deal to fear from what may be called excessive
publicity, or rather from the loss by individuals of the right to
privacy.
Furthermore, while The Right to Privacy was the first article to advocate a
distinct legal right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis found wide-ranging support
for their proposal in case law. The common law furnished no explicit right to
privacy, but a number of judicial opinions in cases concerning intellectual
property, contract, and libel already seemed to further an underlying principle
37. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 196.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 193 (arguing that "[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.").
40. Id. at 195. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1888) (discussing the right to be
free from physical attack). The phrase also appeared in the copyright case Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S.
591, 634 (1834) ("The defendant asks nothing-wants nothing, but to be let alone until it can be shown
that he has violated the rights of another.").
41. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195 (calling Godkin's article a discussion by "an able
writer" of "the evil of invasion of privacy by the newspapers"). See E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the
Citizen: To His Own Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER'S MAG. 58 (1890).
42. E.L. Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, 12 J. SOC. SCI. 69, 80, 82 (1880) (discussing
intrusions by the press into personal affairs).
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of privacy. In Warren and Brandeis's estimation, the law was "groping" to
protect private information through other established doctrines. 43 Their article
was not, therefore, a piece of judicial legislation, but rather an explication of a
hidden legal right: "[T]he existing law affords a principle from which may be
invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from invasion either by the too
enterprising press, the photographer, of the possessor of any other modem
device for rewording or reproducing scenes or sounds."44 They were merely
matching modem needs to established doctrine.45
According to Warren and Brandeis, intellectual property cases in particular
upheld the "general right of the individual to be let alone. 46 Whereas copyright
statutes guaranteed an author profits, they argued, the common law afforded the
more capacious right to control the act of publication or not to publish at A1.
47
Moreover, because prepublication rights did not depend on the quality of a
work-a letter or scribble received the same protection as a masterpiece-
Warren and Brandeis maintained that such rights protected individuals' privacy
more than their literary property. 48 Their article draws at some length on Prince
Albert v. Strange4 9 and also invokes the copyright cases Woolsey v. Judd,50
515 53Millar v. Taylor,5 and Jefferys v. Boosey,52 as well as trade secret law.
43. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 212.
44. Id. at 206.
45. Obviously this claim was, and remains, controversial, and many scholars have questioned the
legal and factual bases for the right to privacy Warren and Brandeis advanced. See, e.g., Denis O'Brien,
The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 437 (1902) (discussing the Roberson case and defending the
court's decision not to "embark in the business of making new law to suit a particular case"). For more
contemporary criticisms, see Barron, supra note 27; Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean By "Right to
Privacy"?, 4 S.D. L. REv. 1 (1959); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a
Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291 (1983).
46. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 205.
47. See id. at 200.
48. See id. at 199, 205.
49. 41 Eng. Rep. 1171, aff'd 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 321 (1849) (enjoining a printer from publishing a
catalogue of Prince Albert's etchings and suggesting that not only a property right, but also a more
fundamental right to privacy was being safeguarded: "Upon the principle, therefore, of protecting
property, it is that the common law... shelters the privacy and seclusion of thought and sentiments
committed to writing, and desired by the author to remain not generally known."), discussed in Warren
& Brandeis, supra note 3, at 200-05.
50. 11 How. Pr. 49, 51 (N.Y. Sup. 1855) (holding that the publication of private letters without the
writer's consent was a violation of the writer's property interest), noted in Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 3, at 200 n.3.
51. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769) (recognizing perpetual common-law copyright in a divided opinion).
Justice Yates, the sole dissenter who argued that ideas should not be treated as property, implied a right
to privacy in his opinion: "It is certain every man has a right to keep his own sentiments, if he pleases.
He has certainly a right to judge whether he will make them public, or commit them only to the sight of
his friends," quoted in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 198 n.2. Justice Yates was vindicated five
years later when the substantive decision of Millar v. Taylor was revised in Donaldson v. Beckett, I Eng.
Rep. 837 (1774) (ruling that copyright was limited in duration and not a perpetual or absolute privilege).
52. 10 Eng. Rep: 681 (1854), cited in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 194 n.6, 200 n.2.
53. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 212.
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In addition to the implicit protection offered in intellectual property cases,
Warren and Brandeis argued, courts often redressed invasions of privacy by
finding a breach of contract or confidence. The judges in Pollard v.
Photographic Co., for instance, held that a photo studio could not sell cards
with a woman's picture on them; the plaintiff had agreed to have her photo
taken but not published, and the court ruled that publication would breach an
implied contract between photographer and subject.54 While they agreed with
the outcome of this decision, Warren and Brandeis worried about its reasoning
in the face of technological advances. They insisted, "now that modem devices
afford abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs without any
participation by the injured party, the protection granted by the law must be
placed upon a broader foundation [than breach of contract]. ' 55 Indeed, a
"somewhat notorious case"56 a short time after Pollard underscored the
limitations of the implied contract doctrine with regard to photographs. Actress
Marion Manola appeared on stage in tights during a Broadway play and was
secretly photographed by two members of the audience. In Marion Manola v.
Stevens & Myers, the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendants from publishing
her picture and, just months before Warren and Brandeis's article, received a
preliminary injunction. 7 Her suit was discussed at great length in the
newspapers, though this seemed hypocritical to those who found verbal
descriptions as invasive as photographic depictions. 8 As E.L. Godkin noted in
an astute early commentary, publicity would often be necessary to redress
invasions of privacy: "[T]he man who feels outraged by publicity will, in order
to stop or punish it, have to expose himself to a great deal more publicity. '59 To
Warren and Brandeis, cases like Manola v. Stevens suggested that a modem
54. 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888), cited in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 208-10. Warren and
Brandeis also quote at some length the opinion in Tuck v. Priester, 19 Q.B.D. 639 (1887) (holding that a
printer breached an implied contract by selling unauthorized reproductions of a picture a customer left
for copying). Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 208 & 209 n. 1. In addition, they discuss Abernethy
v. Hutchinson, 47 Eng. Rep. 1313 (1825) (enjoining medical students from publishing a series of their
teacher's lectures based on an implied confidence). Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 207-08. The
lawyers further note that in Prince Albert v. Strange Lord Cottenham located a breach of trust in
addition to a violation of property rights. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 208.
55. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 210-11.
56. Id. at 195.
57. Apparently there was no reported opinion for this case, but The New York Times commented on
it on June 15, 18, and 21, 1890. See Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1890, at 2; Manola Gets
an Injunction, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1890, at 3; Photographed in Tights, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1890, at
2. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 195 n.7. See also W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 850 n.10 (1984) (citing Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890
(unreported)).
58. See Liberty vs. License, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Jan. 26, 1890, at 6.
59. E.L. Godkin, The Right to Privacy, 51 NATION 496 (1890) (continuing, "[iln order to bring his
persecutors to justice, he will have to go through a process which will result in an exposure of his pivate
affairs tenfold greater than that originally made by the offending article.").
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right to privacy could not be limited to special relationships but must instead be
a right "against the world."60
Most relevant in this respect was libel law, which also furnished some
6protection for an individual's privacy in the nineteenth century. Of course,
defamation lawsuits hold the truth of the published matter to be a complete
62defense, while an invasion of privacy is often injurious precisely because it
concerns true information. Nonetheless, courts had extended the civil libel
remedy to cover substantially true accounts; judges insisted on the exact truth
of all published information and on publication of the truth in its entirety. 6' A
loss of privacy could therefore be addressed in a defamation suit as long as the
offending publication contained some inaccuracy or omission.
Given these disparate but rich precedents, Warren and Brandeis concluded
that the law was advancing toward a more specific right to privacy. Rather than
shelter the principle of privacy under the guises of intellectual property,
contract, and libel law and run the risk that future technological developments
would outstrip the relevance of these doctrines, the lawyers insisted it was time
to explicitly safeguard the right of the individual to be let alone.
B. Domestic Privacy
"Yellow journalism" and the concerns it raised about informational privacy
constituted only one of the historical developments motivating Warren and
Brandeis. Their article also stemmed from a broad social ideology of the
nineteenth century-the doctrine of separate spheres and the division between
the public market, which was gendered male, and the private home, which was
gendered female.64 Industrialization during the Victorian era spawned not only
a popular culture of publicity but also a so-called cult of domesticity that
celebrated the home as a refuge from the sordid marketplace where increasing
numbers worked. This separation of the spheres was always more prescriptive
than descriptive-lower-class women, slaves, and immigrants certainly worked
outside home, and many upper-class women were active in voluntary
65associations. Nonetheless, as an ideology, the doctrine of separate spheres
was extraordinarily influential, and it left its mark on a series of important legal
60. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 213.
61. See Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REv 1892, 1907-
08(1981).
62. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *126; WILLIAM
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 116, at 796-97.
63. Note, supra note 61, at 1907 (citing Sharpe v. Stephenson, 34 N.C. (12 Ired.) 348, 350 (1851),
and McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 43 N.W. 431, 437 (Mich. 1889)).
64. See generally NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD 63-100 (1977); Frances E. Olsen,
The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983);
Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, AM. Q. 151 (1966).
65. See Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows": Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REv. 819, 861-82.
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decisions, most notably Bradwell v. Illinois, which upheld Illinois' exclusion of
women from the legal profession. 66 In an oft-cited concurrence, Justice Bradley
cast "the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood" and insisted that "[t]he paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother.,
67
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the case that most explicitly
addresses a right to privacy before Warren and Brandeis's article concerned not
an unwelcome publication but rather the privacy a woman could expect in her
home. In DeMay v. Roberts the Supreme Court of Michigan awarded damages
against a physician who brought an untrained (and perhaps more damning,
unmarried) assistant into the plaintiffs home to observe her childbirth. 6' The
court held that childbirth was a "sacred" occasion and ruled that DeMay's legal
"right of privacy" had been violated.69 Implicitly linking the privacy of the
home to the privacy of the female body, the court secured protection for both
the woman and her domestic space.70
More commonly, however, the law protected the privacy of the man in his
home-a sheltered space in which he controlled not only his own privacy but
also that of his wife and children. English and American criminal procedure
long held a man's house to be his castle, 7' and trespass law secured the privacy
of the physical home from unwanted intruders.72 The idea that a man's home
was his inviolable space also underlay the Third Amendment's guarantee
against quartering soldiers and the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure. Judge Cooley, who wrote of the "right to be
let alone," explicated the link between the criminal procedural aspect of privacy
and the Fourth Amendment: "The maxim that 'every man's house is his castle'
is made a part of our constitutional law in the clause prohibiting unreasonable
66. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
67. Id. at 141.
68. 9N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
69. Id. at 149. Curiously, this case attracted little media attention when it was decided, and Warren
and Brandeis do not cite it in their article.
70. Pollard v. Photographic Co. and Manola v. Stevens would again focus on the female body and
highlight a particular social concern with women as private beings even when they entered public
spaces.
71. See, e.g., Paxton's Case, Mass. Sup. Ct. 1761, reprinted in Quincy's Mass. Rep. 1761-62, 51
(1865) (insisting that "a man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet he is well guarded as a prince in
his castle"); Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1605); Anonymous, Y.B.
Mich. 21 Hen. 7, f. 39, pl. 50 (1499), cited in 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 316 n.2 (J. H.
Baker ed., 1978). See also 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *223
(justifying criminal punishment of burglary, arson, nuisance, and eavesdropping and arguing that the law
has "so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house that it stiles it his castle, and will
never suffer it to be violated with impunity").
72. See Note, supra note 61, at 1894-96 (discussing the moorings of trespass law in the maxim "a
man's home is his castle").
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searches and seizures."73 In Boyd v. United States, decided just four years
before the publication of The Right to Privacy, Justice Bradley insisted that the
Fourth Amendment was intended to protect "the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life."74 Later, Brandeis himself initiated the expansion of
Fourth Amendment protections when, as a Justice, he again invoked "the right
to be let alone" in his famous Olmstead dissent.75
While Warren and Brandeis located the most explicit precedents for their
right to privacy in cases concerning intellectual property and breach of contract,
the notion of domestic privacy and its attendant patriarchal ordering of the
family also informed their article. The very intellectual property cases they cite
frequently exhibit their own logic of domesticity. In Prince Albert v. Strange,
for example, the Vice-Chancellor not only referenced the Prince Consort's
property rights, but called the publication "an intrusion... offensive to the
inbred sense of propriety natural to every man-if intrusion, indeed, fitly
describes a sordid spying into the privacy of domestic life-into the home (a
word hitherto sacred among us)." 76 Warren and Brandeis, too, focused on the
man's privacy within his home. They insisted that gossip columns only
gathered their material by "intrusion upon the domestic circle, 77 and further
decried that "[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have
invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.',
7 8
The situating of Warren and Brandeis's proposal within nineteenth-century
domestic ideology had important implications for women's privacy rights at the
turn of the century. Most obviously, the lawyers treated privacy as a male
prerogative. They did not so much use the male pronoun as a universal (a
pardonable offense in nineteenth-century tracts) as describe a distinctly male
privacy, and their examples-for instance, the man who does not dine with his
wife and wishes to keep this a secret79--underscore the gendered meanings of
privacy in their article. In their view, a husband could keep his domestic
activities to himself, but would his wife enjoy the right to keep her dining
habits a secret? It is doubtful, for, in casting property ownership as the implicit
basis for a right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis suggested that a man had the
73. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299-300 (1868).
74. 116 U.S. 616,630(1886).
75. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the makers of the Constitution "conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment").
76. 64 Eng. Rep. at 313.
77. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 196.
78. Id. at 195.
79. See id. at 201.
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right to determine not only the bounds of his own privacy but also those of his
family members. E.L. Godkin put it most explicitly: "The right to decide how
much... of his own private doings and affairs, and those of his family living
under his roof, the public at large shall have is... one of [man's] natural
rights.,, 80 A woman's dining habits would be her husband's private information,
not her own.
As this suggests, The Right to Privacy conflates various types of privacy,
for Warren and Brandeis explicitly champion an individualistic, private male
personality, but this personality itself emerges through a category of social
interaction--domestic relationships-that the lawyers also label "private.8
Warren and Brandeis conclude, "[t]he common law has always recognized a
man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to his own officers engaged
in the execution of its command. Shall the courts thus close the front entrance
to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient
curiosity? 82  As their rhetorical finish highlights, Warren and Brandeis
reference both the privacy of the individual and the privacy of the home, and
they layer the two, indelibly linking male privacy to family privacy. The
seemingly inviolate masculine personality in fact depends on relationships that
are shielded from public scrutiny. This had notable repercussions for
nineteenth-century women. Because male privacy contained within it female
experience, women were the objects rather than the subjects of privacy. They
represented the category "private" and the sheltered domestic sphere, but, in the
words of Warren and Brandeis's contemporary, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, the
privacy of the home was no more than a "filmy fiction" for women.83 Within
this space they did not exercise a meaningful right to privacy, for their homes
were their husbands' castles. 4
80. Godkin, supra note 41, at 65.
81. For instance, when Warren and Brandeis discuss the man who does not dine with his wife, they
determine that what is protected is "[s]urely not the intellectual act of recording the fact that the husband
did not dine with his wife, but that fact itself. It is not the intellectual product, but the domestic
occurrence." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 201.
82. Id. at 220.
83. CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE HOME 45, 40 (Univ. of Illinois Press 1974) (1903)
(continuing, "[firom parlour to kitchen, from cellar to garret [the mother] is at the mercy of children,
servants, tradesmen, and callers. So chased and trodden is she that the very idea of privacy is lost to her
mind; she never had any, she doesn't know what it is"). In an earlier work, Gilman distinguished family
privacy from individual privacy. See CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS (Carl N.
Degler ed., Harper & Row 1966) (1898).
84. Gillian Brown argues that "the nineteenth century advanced and delimited individualism by
identifying selfhood with the feminine but denying it to women." GILLIAN BROWN, DOMESTIC
INDIVIDUALISM: IMAGINING SELF IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4-5 (1990), By extension, this
construct denied women forms of privacy that rest on individuality and autonomy. Women were the
objects of individualism and privacy-necessary for their construction, but excluded from their
enjoyment. See generally William E. Moddelmog, Disowning "Personality ": Privacy and Subjectivity
in The House of Mirth, 70 AM. LIT. 337, 342-45 (1998) (discussing assumptions about female privacy
and subjectivity at the turn of the century).
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These clear shortcomings of privacy rights for women have led, in more
recent years, to a powerful feminist reevaluation. Because women have
traditionally been symbols of privacy rather than full legal subjects, scholars
argue, they have had too much privacy in terms of imposed domestic isolation,
modesty, and chastity and not enough in terms of private choice.85 Worse, by
protecting a man's home as his castle and refusing to intervene, the law has
drawn a curtain86 over the home and sheltered wife beating and marital rape.87
Due in part to this problematic tradition of privacy, many legal scholars have
challenged the grounding of abortion88 and contraceptive8 9 rights in privacy,
arguing that equality should be the principle guaranteeing such constitutional
rights.90 While these critiques did not appear until the late twentieth century,
the limitations of female privacy were apparent in Warren and Brandeis's era
and called into question the value of a right to privacy for women.
85. See generally, ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1988). See also Lisa R. Pruitt, "On the Chastity of Women all the Property in the World Depends":
Injury from Sexual Slander in the Nineteenth Century, 78 IND. L.J. 965 (2003) (arguing that sexual
slander law commodified women's sexual privacy and propriety to the benefit of their fathers and
husbands).
86. A popular metaphor in nineteenth-century cases concerning domestic violence was the curtain
that concealed the home from the public gaze. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453, 457
(1868) (arguing that the evils of domestic violence were less than "the evils which would result from
raising the curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber");
State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874) ("If no permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty
nor dangerous violence shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze,
and leave the parties to forget and forgive"). See generally Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
87. See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO
STATE L.J. 1, 18-28 (2000); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973
(1991); Siegel, supra note 86. Doctrines such as coverture, which held husband and wife to be one
person in law, and interspousal tort immunity ensured that there was little legal recourse for domestic
violence. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430 (describing husband and wife as "one
person in law"). The marital rape exemption, which grew out of the marital unity doctrine, has similarly
sheltered violence against women. See generally Note, To Have and To Hold: The Marital Rape
Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1986).
88. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that categorical prohibition of abortion
violated the Fourteenth Amendment). Justice Blackmun's majority opinion stated, "This right to
privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court, in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
89. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute
forbidding the use and distribution of contraceptives violated the right of marital privacy). Griswold
derived the right of marital privacy from First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment privacy cases, Fourteenth
Amendment liberty cases, and the older idea of the home-as-castle articulated by Lord Camden in Entick
v. Carrington. Id. at 481-86.
90. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L REV. 375, 386 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955, 1020 (1984); CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOwARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184-
94 (1989).
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C. The Response to The Right to Privacy
In the decades following Warren and Brandeis's proposal, debates over
privacy rights came to occupy a central place in courtrooms, legislatures, and
newspaper columns throughout the country. Most immediately, several ccurts
in Massachusetts and New York accepted the new right to privacy and enjoined
the use of defendants' names and likenesses in advertisements. 9' The first case
to attract great attention, however, held that no right to privacy existed under
common law. Abigail Roberson filed suit when Franklin Mills Flour published
her picture on posters without her consent and accompanied the text with the
words, "Flour of the Family." In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., the
New York Court of Appeals rejected Roberson's use of Warren and Brandeis's
ideas as a basis for recovery and insisted that a right to privacy would lead to
"litigation bordering on the absurd.,
92
What is perhaps more noteworthy about this case, though, was the public
outcry that met the decision, an outcry that led one of the judges to defend the
court's holding in a law review article.93 Although it did not explicitly
encourage such action, moreover, the court implied that the New York
Legislature might create a statutory right to privacy,94 and The New York Times
argued vehemently for immediate legislative action.95 Sounding much like
critics of the paper, the Times maintained, "[i]f there be... no law now to
cover these savage and horrible practices, practices incompatible with the
claims of community in which they are allowed to be committed with the
impunity to be called a civilized community, then the decent people will say
,96that it is high time that there were such a law." Heeding public demand, the
New York Legislature joined California in enacting privacy statutes, and
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Utah soon followed. 
97
91. See, e.g., Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (enjoining the publishing of a picture of
an actor in a newspaper popularity contest without his consent); Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs
Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (enjoining the use of a doctor's name in advertising medicine
without his consent). See also Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280 (C.C. Mass. 1894) (holding that a
public figure may not prohibit the publication of his biography and portrait, but suggesting that private
figures retain this right). But see Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285, 289 (Mich. 1899)
(criticizing Warren and Brandeis and calling an invasion of privacy "one of the ills that, under the law,
cannot be redressed").
92. 64 N.E. 442,443 (N.Y. 1902).
93. O'Brien, supra note 45.
94. See Roberson, 64 N.E. at 443.
95. Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8 (discussing Roberson).
96. Id.
97. In 1899 California made it a misdemeanor to publish a person's portrait in a newspaper or book
or on a handbill or poster without his or her consent. This law was, however, never used to prosecute a
case and was repealed in 1915. Gormley, supra note 28, at 1354 n.90. For New York, see Act of Apr. 6,
1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, 1903 N.Y. LAWS 308 (prohibiting use of an individual's name or likeness,
without consent, for advertising or trade). This statute later became an amendment to New York's Civil
Rights Law. N.Y.CIv.RIGHTS §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988). For Pennsylvania, see Act of
May 12, 1903, 1903 PA. LAWS 265 (allowing damages for negligent but nondefamatory newspaper
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But the courts did not simply cede the issue to legislatures throughout the
country. In Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., decided in 1905, the
Supreme Court of Georgia recognized a right to privacy grounded in Warren
and Brandeis's arguments. 98 The plaintiff sued when an insurance company
published, without his consent, his name, picture, and a feigned endorsement in
a newspaper advertisement. Overruling the trial court and criticizing the earlier
Roberson decision, the justices found a right to privacy "derived from natural
law" and awarded damages.99 The opinion predicted that a right to privacy
would come to be widely acknowledged in American law, 100 and, after years of
increasing acceptance, the Restatement of Torts in 1939 codified the right.' 0 '
D. Wharton and Privacy
Edith Wharton may or may not have been aware of particular cases and
statutes implicating privacy, but it seems almost certain she would have been
familiar with wide-ranging social discussions that grappled with privacy's
meaning, value, and violation in the years she was writing her most famous
novels. Her literary career, in fact, mapped almost perfectly onto the years of
most heated debate. She published one of her first poems in the July 1890 issue
of Scribner's Magazine in which E.L. Godkin published his article on privacy,
and she died two years before the first Restatement of Torts firmly established
a right to privacy. Wharton had residences in both New York and
Massachusetts, the two states that most explicitly and publicly tackled
invasions of privacy in the years following Warren and Brandeis's article, and
she no doubt read newspapers such as The New York Times that often contained
invective reporting on privacy cases.
Evidence of Wharton's concern with privacy, and the law more generally,
abounds in her novels. Her plots often turn on issues of privacy and publicity;
publications). The law was relatively unused and was repealed in 1907. See Gormley, supra note 28, at
1354 n.92 (citing Act of May 1, 1907, 1907 PA. LAWS 124). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (1950)
(enacted 1904) (modeled on New York statute); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8 to -9 (1953) (enacted
1909) (modeled on New York statute).
98. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
99. Id. at 70.
100. Id. at 80-81 (arguing, "[s]o thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within proper
limits, as a legal right, the right of privacy, . . . that we venture to predict that the day will come that the
American bar will marvel that a contrary view was even entertained by judges of eminence and ability").
101. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 876 (1939). The Restatement of Torts in 1977
distinguished four separate privacy torts: unreasonable inclusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or
solitude; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; appropriation of the
plaintiff's name or likeness; publicity that unreasonably places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). This is not, of course, to argue that the
Pavesich court's sweeping prediction has been realized in full. Many lawyers and judges remain
skeptical about the right to privacy. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 45; Kalven, supra note 45; Richard
Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 (1979). Nonetheless, more than a
century after Warren and Brandeis's article, privacy is an established part of tort law.
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her characters speak of "rights," "property," and "personality"; 10 2 and vignettes
within the novels evoke the newspaper columns and advertisements of the day.
In The Age of Innocence, for instance, Wharton describes a shoe-polish
advertisement that could readily have found itself at the center of a Roberson-
like lawsuit, 10 3 and a mother's concern about prying photographers at her
daughter's wedding recalls the apocryphal Warren story.'104 A humorous
moment in Wharton's late novel, Twilight Sleep, plays on the tension between
individual and family privacy. Pauline Manford begins to deliver her birth
control speech to the assembled Mothers' Meeting and declares that female
privacy is of utmost importance: "Personality-room to develop in: not only
elbow-room but body-room and soul-room, and plenty of both. That's what
every human being has a right to."' 05 Catching some astonished glances from
the audience, she redefines her grand opening as her antagonists' position and
champions the importance of motherhood-in other words, of domestic
relationships rather than personal privacy, of a family privacy that would limit
the mother's privacy rather than an individual right to be let alone. 106 While
amusing, Wharton's satire on Pauline's attempt to "reconcile these
contradictions ' 1°7 is more than mere satire, and Pauline becomes a mouthpiece
for important questions of Wharton's fiction: How to reconcile autonomy with
intimacy, tradition with modernity, and privacy with publicity?
Wharton returns to these questions again and again not only in her novels,
but also in her autobiographical works. As a female writer who sought both to
establish her reputation and to protect her private life, Wharton shed the model
of domestic lady writer and self-consciously positioned herself in the public
sphere.10 8 She was accordingly sensitive to her competing needs for publicity
and privacy and to the complications of each. Although feminist criticisms of
privacy rights would not emerge until after her death in 1937, Wharton's works
offer a nuanced critique of Warren and Brandeis's proposal, particularly with
regard to women-both her female characters and her own authorial self. I will
take up this critique in the following two sections of the paper.
102. See, e.g., Edith Wharton, The Other Two, 32 COLLIER'S WEEKLY 15 (1904); EDITH
WHARTON, TWILIGHT SLEEP (Simon & Schuster 1997) (1927). See generally Moddelmog, supra note
84, at 340.
103. EDITH WHARTON, THE AGE OF INNOCENCE 35 (D. Appelton & Co. 1920).
104. Worrying about newspaper reporters who fight to get near the wedding, Mrs. Welland
exclaims, "Why, they might take a photograph of my child andput it in the papers!" Id. at 182-83.
105. WHARTON, TWILIGHT SLEEP, supra note 102, at 97.
106. Id. at 98-99.
107. Id. at 99.
108. See generally Amy Kaplan, Edith Wharton's Profession ofAuthorship, 53 ELH 443 (1986).
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III. EXPOSING THE FICTION OF FEMALE PRIVACY
Wharton's engagement with questions of privacy and publicity at the turn
of the century is readily apparent in two of her most popular novels, The House
of Mirth and The Custom of the Country, each of which follows a female
protagonist as she negotiates elite New York society. The House of Mirth is the
story of Lily Bart, a beautiful woman who is unmarried at age twenty-nine due
largely to her own ambivalence about New York's marriage market. She
repeatedly thwarts possible engagements and does not marry her true love,
Lawrence Selden, initially because he is not wealthy and later due to a series of
mishaps. Visiting her friends' rich estate, Lily cunningly and yet somewhat
naively appeals to the married Gus Trenor to invest her money for her, and she
begins to spend lavishly. When Trenor propositions her, she learns that he has
been giving her his own profits, and he insists she repay her debt in sexual
attentions. Lily recoils from him and embarks on a Mediterranean cruise with
George and Bertha Dorset. Bertha has invited Lily to keep her husband
distracted while she pursues an affair, and, to deflect attention from herself,
Bertha ultimately dismisses Lily from the yacht, insinuating that she and
George were having an affair. Expelled from society, Lily could rebuild her
reputation by publicizing an earlier affair between Bertha and Selden, and she
is encouraged to do so by her wealthy suitors, but she refuses to trade on
Selden's past. Instead, she becomes a secretary and milliner and finally moves
into a boarding house. When she receives a small inheritance from her aunt's
estate, she pays off her debt to Trenor and overdoses-perhaps intentionally-
on the chloral she has come to rely on for sleep. Selden arrives the next
morning intending to propose marriage and finds Lily dead.
The Custom of the Country's heroine, Undine Spragg, is more ruthless than
Lily and rises quickly in society after her nouveau-riche family moves from
Kansas to New York City. Like a robber baron, Undine trades on her beauty to
gain access to old-money New York, and she wins over the romantic poet
Ralph Marvell. Following their marriage and the birth of a son, Undine finds
herself unsatisfied, and she divorces Ralph, who ultimately commits suicide so
as to avoid the potentially vicious custody battle Undine has contrived. Undine
next infiltrates the French fauborg society and marries aristocrat Raymond de
Chelles. Again discontented after her conquest and unwilling to moderate her
lifestyle in accordance with French tradition, Undine divorces once more and
marries her final husband, Elmer Moffatt, an incredibly wealthy businessman
who is also originally from Kansas and was secretly Undine's husband in her
adolescence. By the end of the novel, both Undine and Moffatt are recognized
as prominent members of the upper class, for the nouveau-riche have
effectively replaced established society at the top of the social hierarchy. But
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the insatiable Undine remains unhappy, as she learns of a role her divorce has
barred her from and comes to desire it most of all.
These are necessarily simplistic summaries of Wharton's novels, which are
not only well-plotted fiction, but also incisive social satire. In The House of
Mirth and The Custom of the Country, Wharton responds to the same mass
publicity and voracious media as Warren and Brandeis, and she levels niany
similar complaints. Her fiction also stands in revealing counterpoint to the
lawyers' article, however. While condemning an overreaching press and an
invasive social gaze, Wharton nevertheless maintains that publicity is essential
to her heroines. Insofar as both Lily's and Undine's subjectivity is enabled via
publicity, Wharton suggests that a right to be let alone would be meaningless
for these women and that privacy necessarily depends on publicity.
A. Conspicuousness and Shamelessness: Damaging Publicity
Five years after publishing The Touchstone, Wharton rewrote Glennard's
decision in The House of Mirth. While Glennard momentarily considers
burning Mrs. Aubyn's letters but instead publishes her sentiments for personal
gain, Lily, who operates in a world saturated by publicity, secretly bums
Bertha's letters to Selden. Lily has less to lose and more to gain than
Glennard-whereas he claims to be a friend of Mrs. Aubyn's lover, Lily
actually is the third party to the romance in question, but she nonetheless
honors the privacy of the letters that could reinstate her in New York society,
letters that presumably, like Mrs. Aubyn's "unloved letters,"'10 9 reflect Bertha's
continued interest in Selden after he has ended their affair.
Driven largely by her love for Selden, Lily's protection of Bertha's letters
stands as a painfully selfless act in a novel in which "conspicuousness passe[s]
for distinction and the society column [is] the roll of fame.' 10 The letters, sold
by a chambermaid who needs money for rent, come to Lily appropriately
wrapped in dirty newspaper, which denotes not only the route they have taken
to her and the sordidness of buying another woman's private correspondence,
but also the possibility of her using these communications to publicly
coordinate her return to society's graces. She could, that is, treat the letters as if
they were themselves newspaper articles-bits of private information sold on
the public market-but she recognizes this possibility as self-contaminating
and does not even read them. Although she considers blackmailing Bertha, she
further realizes that this approach would guard the letters' privacy but would
necessitate profiting by a secret of Selden's past, and this chills "her blood with
shame.""' Instead, she bums the package in Selden's library, simultaneously
109. Wharton, The Touchstone, supra note 1, at 370.
110. EDITH WHARTON, THE HOUSE OF MIRTH 227 (Signet Books 2000) (1905).
111. Id. at 322.
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destroying its threat and its promise. The essential privacy of this act is
underscored by Selden's failure to note Lily's gesture; his usually microscopic
vision does not see her shelter his privacy, and such a pronounced lack of
observation in a novel marked by scrutiny and publicity indelibly aligns Lily
with privacy.
Lily's act is all the more noteworthy because Bertha, earlier in the novel,
has staged an elaborate embarrassment of Lily that gathers its force through
publicity. In contrast to the soft intimacy of Selden's library, Bertha's dismissal
of Lily from her yacht occurs in a large, thronged restaurant where "their table
seem[s] set apart in a special glare of publicity" and Dabham of the Riviera
Notes snatches eagerly at the scene with his tentacle-like eyes to amplify its
visibility. 1 2 Dabham both represents and produces the shallow publicity of
New York high society, and his article, which Bertha has counted on, will
guarantee Lily's expulsion from this society. It is not Lily's dismissal that
matters-particularly given the nearly universal recognition that she has been
wrongly, if obliquely, accused-but rather the display and publication of this
dismissal.
Indeed, one of the most resonant features of The House of Mirth and The
Custom of the Country is the culture of publicity that permeates American
society and, in turn, the pages of Wharton's fiction. Wharton's concern was
widely shared by other authors, including her close friend Henry James, who
wrote about "the invasion, the impudence and shamelessness, of the newspaper
and the interviewer, the devouring publicity of [modem] life, the extinction of
all sense between public and private."' 3 Such pervasive and invasive publicity
also, as I have discussed, elicited E.L. Godkin's pieces and Warren and
Brandeis's article. Godkin discusses the unique violation of gossip published in
newspapers:
[A]s long as gossip was oral, it spread, as regards any one individual,
over a very small area, and was confined to the immediate circle of his
acquaintances. It did not reach, or but barely reached, those who knew
nothing of him. It did not make his name, or his walk, or his
conversation familiar to strangers. And what is more to the purpose, it
spared him the pain and mortification of knowing that he was
gossipped about. A man seldom heard of oral gossip about him which
simply.made him ridiculous, or trespassed on his lawful privacy, but
made no positive attack upon his reputation."
14
112. Id.at 227.
113. HENRY JAMES, THE NOTEBOOKS OF HENRY JAMES 82 (F.O. Matthiessen & Kenneth B.
Murdock eds., 1961).
114. Godkin, supra note 41, at 66.
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Warren and Brandeis still more vehemently describe gossip's evolution
from a mere "resource of the idle" to "a trade," and complain that newspaper
columns brim with lascivious gossip." S
The Custom of the Country's Mrs. Heeny, a masseur and general confidant
of New York society, embodies the fusion of provincial gossip and mechanized
publicity that Godkin and Warren and Brandeis bemoan. She is the idle
gossiper of a small community and trades secrets of New York's elite as she
moves between clients. At the same time, she carries a bag stuffed with strips
of newspaper that depersonalize private lives and, often tattered and grimy
from use, serve as symbols of modemity's far-reaching publicity.
Mrs. Heeny is, however, an innocuous and even compassionate figure for
the union of gossip and mass media, and it is instead through the relationship of
Undine and Ralph that Wharton dramatizes the conflict of publicity and
privacy. Undine is a product of showy modem America; she relishes her
appearances in newspapers and bathes in the "bright publicity of the American
air. ' 16 Associating with figures like Peter Van Degen and Elmer Moffat,
whose bulging stare and red glossy face respectively serve as metonymies of
their characters, Undine only feels comfortable when she is the center of
attention. Ralph, by contrast, only feels comfortable when he has escaped
public attention and can inhabit his own mind. If bulging eyes and shiny faces
designate "promiscuous" men, Ralph is characterized by his "furtive
possession" of a secret childhood cave,' 17 and he seeks shelter from modernity
in privacy.
Such shelter proves meaningless, however, when Undine marshals the
forces of publicity to steamroll Ralph's private life. She demands a divorce, and
he is disgusted at the thought of taking the public into his confidence by
contesting her claims, but he later finds that his own reticence has not stopped
the publicity machine:
[A]s he sat in the Subway on his way down-town, his eye was caught
by his own name on the first page of the heavily head-lined paper
which the unshaved occupant of the next seat held between grimy
fists .... For the first time in his life the coarse fingering of public
curiosity had touched the secret places of his soul, and nothing that had
gone before seemed as humiliating as this trivial comment on his
tragedy.11S
Wharton is relentless; Ralph's media persecution does not stop in the dirty
subway, but continues at his dentist's office, where his plight becomes one of
115. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 196.
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the "Heart problems" proposed to readers with a gramophone, corset, and
vanity-box offered as prizes for its solution. A short time later, he reads about
Undine's second marriage in the newspapers.' 19
It is particularly by focusing the end of the novel on Undine's son that
Wharton underscores her criticism of modem publicity and its perverse
function of inverting public and private relationships. 20 Because Undine seeks
the crowd's notice at the expense of attending to her family, her intimate
relationships become secondary to her public displays. Lacking direct access to
his mother, Paul learns about her through Mrs. Heeny's suitably "long
discoloured strip" of newspaper, which most of her clients have already
perused. 121 Of course, the newspaper's brand of information, concerning
Undine's appearance and possessions, is not what he desires; but, Wharton
suggests, there is nothing else to know about Undine. Her private relationships
can be no more than second-hand publicity.
B. The Necessity of Publicity and Limitations of Being "Let Alone"
While The Custom of the Country's criticism of modem publicity is clear,
to reduce the novel to this critique would be to underestimate Wharton's
powers as an author and acute psychological observer. Undine's showiness is
often grotesque and inevitably superficial, but Wharton forces us to ask what
privacy for a woman like Undine would mean. Unlike Ralph but like many of
the women in her milieu, Undine lacks a developed autonomous self. She has
not been encouraged to cultivate a private interior; rather, her social worth.
depends on her beauty and her status as a visually pleasing object.
Well aware of such social appraisals, Undine has acquired an uncanny
ability to turn herself into an object. After failed attempts to shape his wife's
personality, Ralph realizes that her spirit flutters in a barren, "half-lit place,' 22
but rather than function as a liability, this core emptiness enables her to mold
and remold herself for her observer. As John Berger has famously argued,
socialization by a male gaze results in women who are intemally divided into
subject and object: "A woman must continually watch herself.... Men look at
women. Women watch themselves being looked at." 123 Undine is a perfect
119. Wharton's lengthy indictment may reflect her own anger, while writing The Custom of the
Country, at the rumor of her upcoming separation from Teddy being published in a Paris newspaper.
See SHARI BENSTOCK, No GIFTS FROM CHANCE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EDITH WHARTON 224 (1994).
120. Warren and Brandeis use similar language when discussing gossip: "It both belittles and
perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and
aspirations of a people." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 196.
121. WHARTON, THE CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY, supra note 116, at 366.
122. Id. at 92.
123. JOHN BERGER, WAYS OF SEEING 46-47 (1972). The idea of woman as object, in contrast to
man as subject, is indebted to Simone de Beauvoir. See SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (E.M.
Parshley trans., 1973) (1949). More recently, social psychologists have studied female self-
objectification. See, e.g., Barbara L. Fredrickson & Tomi-Ann Roberts, Objectification Theory: Toward
[Vol. 16:41
Edith Wharton, Privacy, and Publicity
example of this split woman, for "[a] cool spirit within her seemed to watch
over and regulate her sensations, and leave her capable of measuring the
intensity of those she provoked." 124 She is first pleased by being a mother when
she encounters Elmer Moffatt while carrying Paul, and recognizes herself as an
attractive image of young motherhood. As she relishes "the image of her own
charm mirrored in the general admiration,"'1 25 Undine internalizes society's
scrutiny, and she takes self-objectification to its logical extreme, so that the
"image of herself in other minds [is] her only notion of self-seeing."' 126 Her
very personality inheres in performing for an audience; even when society's
mirror is absent, it remains present in her mind so that her inner void is really a
residual mirror.
Lily Bart, Undine's more sympathetic counterpart, similarly relies on the
gaze of the other for her identity,127 but self-objectification is tragic for her in
ways it is not for Undine, who manipulates appearances to her full advantage.
Much of Lily's time is spent considering how others perceive her, for she
inhabits a world in which men collect and consume women and women self-
consciously put themselves on display. 12 On the train to the Trenors' country
house, as she schemes about how to become Percy Gryce's latest item of
Americana, Lily considers the charm of her seemingly effortless presentation as
she watches him watch her make tea. She proves her skill at such displays only
to reveal her ambivalence about them, yet her ambivalence stems not from an
autonomous self-image but rather from seeing herself through a particular set
of eyes-Selden's. While Lily's habit of "scanning her little world through
[Selden's] retina"'129 has the potential to serve as a moral influence beyond the
Understanding Women 's Lived Experiences and Mental Health Risks, 21 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 173,
177 (1997) (arguing that society's objectifying treatment coaxes women to "treat themselves as objects
to be looked at and evaluated"). See also Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons,
in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 2, 7 (J. Ronald Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds., 1971) (drawing on Jean-Paul
Sartre's philosophy to discuss the role of surveillance in limiting the individual's freedom and claiming
that being seen as "an object of scrutiny, as the focus of another's attention, brings one to a new
consciousness of oneself, as something seen through another's eyes," so that the observed person "is
fixed as something-with limited probabilities rather than infinite, indeterminate possibilities").
124. WHARTON, THE CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY, supra note 116, at 184.
125. Id. at 98.
126. Id. at 252.
127. Many literary critics have discussed Lily's reliance on others' perceptions for her sense of self.
See, e.g., JUDITH FRYER, FELICITOUS SPACE: THE IMAGINATIVE STRUCTURES OF EDITH WHARTON AND
WILLA CATHER (1986); Moddelmog, supra note 84, at 337; CYNTHIA GRIFFIN WOLFF, A FEAST OF
WORDS: THE TRIUMPH OF EDITH WHARTON (1977). Gloria Erlich argues that Lily "incorporates the
audience, or viewer, [into her theatrical production] so that she can imagine herself as perceived by the
other." GLORIA ERLICH, THE SEXUAL EDUCATION OF EDITH WHARTON 71 (1992).
128. Appropriately, a favorite touchstone of The House of Mirth's critics has been Thorstein
Veblen's work, which describes "conspicuous consumption" as a defining feature of the leisure class.
Women, in his model, adorn themselves to represent their husbands' wealth and status and thereby
display leisure. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 68-101 (Penguin Books
1981) (1899). See also MAUREEN E. MONTGOMERY, DISPLAYING WOMEN: SPECTACLES OF LEISURE IN
EDITH WHARTON'S NEW YORK (1998).
129. WHARTON, THE HOUSE OF MIRTH, supra note 110, at 56.
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pettiness of New York society, Wharton is careful not to valorize Lily's
dependence on the novel's "negative hero."' 30 Her internalization of Selden's
perspective proves self-destructive, for he, too, values her as an aesthetic
object, even as he speaks of a republic of the spirit.
Throughout the novel, which Wharton first called A Moment's Ornament
and then The Year of the Rose, thereby underscoring the transience of Lily's
decorative identity, Lily acts as both an artist and a piece of art. "You are an
artist, and I happen to be the bit of colour you are using today,"' 31 Selden teases
her, and implicit in his comment is that Lily always paints herself. This is most
literally true in the tableaux vivants scene, when Lily is most an artist and most
an artifact. She engages in a complex act of self-portraiture, representing
herself as the painting of another woman. Seemingly ironically, Wharton,
speaking for the assembled crowd, comments on "the predominance of
personality" and notes that Lily is able to "embody the person represented
without ceasing to be herself."'' 32 It is also at this highly artificial moment of
self-representation that Selden believes he sees "the real Lily Bart.' 33 We are, I
think, initially inclined to read Selden's thoughts as an illustration of his more
pervasive inability to see Lily, for how can this double artifice be "the real
Lily"? Selden habitually registers the slightest details of her appearance but
fails to note more significant aspects of her character. It therefore comes as no
surprise that he would think he was fully seeing Lily when she has turned
herself into a pure surface.
This reading, however, fails to note something fundamental about Lily
herself: Self-objectification is so central to her malleable character that the
"real Lily Bart" is, in many ways, the performance of beauty. Her pliability and
dramatic instinct are the most resonant aspects of her character, and her tableau
vivant merely makes explicit her constant project of artistically fashioning
herself for other eyes. Publicity precedes Lily's sense of personality, for it is
only by looking at herself from without that she can come to know herself.
Both Lily and Undine are not merely split into actor and observer, as John
Berger's formula suggests, but are actually reduced into products of self-
objectification. The "ripples of self-consciousness" that play "up and down
[Undine's] watchful back"'134 and Lily's acute knowledge of how she affects
others constitute each woman's being. Cynthia Griffin Wolff has argued, "[t]he
woman who elects to form her nature as a pleasing accommodation to the
demands of those around her can do so only by a systematic mutilation of her
own identity.... [She] may find that she has retained no more than a hollow,
130. R. W. B. LEwIs, EDITH WHARTON: A BIOGRAPHY 155 (1975) (quoting Wharton).
131. WHARTON, THE HOUSE OF MIRTH, supra note 110, at 68.
132. Id. at 141.
133. Id.
134. WHARTON, THE CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY, supra note 116, at 31.
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empty shell of self. ' 135 Wharton takes her critique farther than Wolff
acknowledges; Lily's and Undine's performances for patriarchal society do not
mutilate identities that somehow precede these performances. Rather, such
performances stunt the development of private personalities from the outset.
Each woman's interiority inheres in self-conscious dramatizations, and she
never realizes the opportunity to forge a self that is not a hollow, other-directed
representation. Even Lily's most significant act-burning Bertha's letters-is
inspired by her internalization of Selden's perspective and functions as an
abnegation of self.
This absence of autonomous personality is highlighted by the fact that both
Undine and Lily hate to be alone. Lily constantly strives "to get away from
herself,"'136 and Undine regards privacy as a mere intermission in life's drama.
To the extent that these women have private personalities, they are the reflected
views of other eyes. Lily and Undine invert the ostensible ordering of privacy
and publicity; instead of private selves that need to be sheltered from the
invasive gaze of modem life, they have public selves that deflate when
unobserved. Wharton is critical of publicity in both of her novels, yet her
protagonists depend on it for the very identity it would seem to erode.
For Lily and Undine, then, the kind of privacy Warren and Brandeis
advocate is not a genuine possibility. This is perhaps not surprising, given that
the lawyers themselves gender privacy as male in their article. Implicitly
criticizing the logic of nineteenth-century domesticity and anticipating late
twentieth-century feminist critiques of privacy, Wharton's novels expose the
consequences of treating women as the objects, rather than subjects, of privacy
and classing their personalities as commodities to be managed by men. She
takes her critique further still when she intimates that the inviolate personality
Warren and Brandeis champion is an elaborate fiction with little meaning for
women and that a right to privacy would therefore not help women fashion or
guard unique identities.
C. Intimacy as Subjectivity
If Lily and Undine's "violate" personalities depend on self-objectification,
Wharton also indicates that a woman's interdependent personality might be
forged through intimacy, which similarly depends on others but is a more
positive, interactive model for self-construction. 137 At the end of The House of
135. WOLFF, supra note 127, at 107.
136. WHARTON, THE HOUSE OF MIRTH, supra note 110, at 16.
137. Many social psychologists have argued that the interdependent self is a non-Western and
female notion, in contrast to the independent self that is Western and male. See, e.g., Susan Cross &
Laura Madson, Models of Self" Self-Construals and Gender, 122 PSYCHOL. BULL. 5, 8 (1997) (arguing
that "women are more likely than men to develop an interdependent self-construal, whereas men are
more likely than women to develop an independent self-construal"); Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu
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Mirth, Lily's very absence of core identity becomes the basis for establishing
interpersonal connections.' 38 Undine lacks not only an autonomous personality
but also the capacity for intimacy that could enhance the self; she regards close
relationships as a pretext for the "total absence of expression,"1 39 and her
"inmost ideal of domestic intimacy" is parading in public with her husband as a
male ornament.14 So too, she dreads pregnancy and considers motherhood a
burden. Like Warren and Brandeis's autonomous male subjects whose homes
and selves are "impregnable," Undine wants to remain impregnable by
avoiding pregnancy.
By contrast, motherhood becomes for Lily a final vision of intimacy that
recasts the malleable boundaries of her personality. Woman's permeable nature
may preclude an autonomous personality, Wharton suggests, but it may also
positively ground an identity that encompasses others and a privacy that
accommodates intimacy. Although not herself a mother, Lily lies with the
imagined presence of a friend's infant, and the baby's weight increases,
"sinking deeper and penetrating her with a strange sense of weakness as though
the child entered into her and became a part of herself."1 41 Earlier in the
evening, Lily tried to leave part of herself with Selden but realized that, while
her personality was intimately connected to his, it was fundamentally her own:
"[T]hat self must indeed live on in his presence, but it must still continue to be
hers. 142
With the baby, Lily develops an affirmative awareness of her violate
personality and recognizes the possibilities of incorporating others into her
fluid self. Pregnancy, which physically unites two bodies, becomes the ultimate
emblem of mutually sustaining interdependence.143 Once Lily experiences this
Kitayama, Culture and the Self. Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 224 (1991) (discussing cultural differences in construals of the self).
138. My argument here resembles Brook Thomas's claim that characters in Henry James's The
Bostonians achieve self-definition through the "space between" people in relationships, but these very
relationships depend on "an emptiness within the self' that allows penetrations by another. THOMAS,
supra note 10, at 70.
139. WHARTON, THE CUSTOM OF THE COUNTRY, supra note 116, at 95.
140. Id. at 318.
141. WHARTON, THE HOUSE OF MIRTH, supra note 110, at 335.
142. Id. at 328.
143. Although Wharton ends The House of Mirth with this positive vision, she suggests her
ongoing ambivalence about the female lack of autonomous identity not only through Lily's self-
objectification and death, but also, in another work, through a phobic vision of women as penetrable
vessels. In The Other Two, Waythom regards his twice-divorced wife as "a shoe that too many feet had
worn." He fears that she has "left hanging" to each of her past married identities "a little of her privacy,
a little of her personality, a little of the inmost self where the unknown god abides," and he conveys an
acute disgust for the "traces" her earlier marriages have left on her nature. Wharton, The Other Two,
supra note 102, at 20. In Wharton's late novel Twilight Sleep, Wharton inverts Waythom's metaphor of
hanging shreds and once again offers an affirmative glimpse of a self created by relationships. In a
landscape of people clamoring to express themselves by severing interpersonal ties, Nona recognizes
that the self cannot be expressed outside of relationships and notes that her personality includes "shreds
and fibres" of other people." WHARTON, TWILIGHT SLEEP, supra note 102, at 201.
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"continuity of life,"' 144 she bemoans her years of solitude and "the feeling of
being something rootless and ephemeral, mere spindrift of the whirling surface
of existence, without anything to which the poor little tentacles of self could
cling before the awful flood submerged them."' 145 In this elaborate metaphor,
Wharton transforms the tentacles of Dabham's eyes from a predatory public
force into the private need of one individual for intimate communion. Although
she will never realize her vision, Lily glimpses the possibility of her "tentacles
of self' grasping others who would help her forge a personality.
IV. WHARTON'S TEXTUAL PERSONALITY
As the baby becomes a part of Lily, Wharton dramatizes her claim that "the
bounds of a personality are not reproducible by a sharp black line, but that each
of us flows imperceptibly into adjacent people and things."'146 This, it seems, is
her answer to the question posed by Vance Weston, the writer-protagonist of
her later novel Hudson River Bracketed: "Where was the real primordial
personality, each man's indestructible inmost self?... Or was there no such
unchangeable nucleus?"'147 Wharton not only undermines Vance's groping for
an autonomous self but also, in her autobiographical writings, suggests that her
own personality was thoroughly interwoven with others, through both intimate
relationships and literary publication. A degree of publicity was essential to her
most private self-construction.
A. Intimacy and Self-Representation
Wharton's memoir A Backward Glance offers the most extended
meditation on her intertwined personality. She begins by casting herself as
"[t]he little girl who eventually became me, but as yet was neither me nor
anybody else in particular, but merely a soft anonymous morsel of humanity"
and describes how she was waked to consciousness by vanity and love.'
48
These two approaches to self-construction almost perfectly reproduce the
tension between Lily's dependence on self-objectification and intimacy.
Although Wharton's discussion of her literary career will again describe a
personality fashioned through self-objectification, she devotes a great deal of
space in her memoirs to close relationships. She depicts Walter Berry as a
friend "who seems not a separate person,... but an expansion, an
interpretation, of one's self, the very meaning of one's soul.' '149 Similarly, she
144. WHARTON, THE HOUSE OF MIRTH, supra note 110, at 339.
145. Id. at 338.
146. EDITH WHARTON, THE WRITING OF FICTION 10 (Simon & Schuster 1997) (1925).
147. EDITH WHARTON, HUDSON RIVER BRACKETED 294 (Scribner's 1985) (1928).
148. EDITH WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE I (Simon & Schuster 1998) (1933).
149. Id. at 115.
20041
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
opens her chapter on Henry James, "[w]hat is one's personality, detached from
that of the friends with whom fate happens to have linked one? I cannot think
of myself apart from the influence of the two or three greatest friendships of my
life." 150 Wharton regards her personality not as inviolate but rather as dynamic
and dependent on relationships.
If she was porously open to the influence of other individuals, she was also
susceptible to literary texts, and she relied on works of art to forge her sense of
self. The image of "making up" she offers us in A Backward Glance
humorously represents her reliance on other works. Even before she could read,
she would hold books, often upside down, and turn pages to simulate reading
aloud while orally creating her own stories. Once she learned to read, not only
her storytelling, but also her very conception of her personality came to depend
on literary works, and throughout her career her imaginative engagement with
other texts provided a means of creating her textual persona and understanding
her inmost self.
Indeed, the Love Diary that documents Wharton's affair with Morton
Fullerton suggests that he came to inform her sense of herself largely through
the influence of literature.' 5' When writing about Fullerton-the bisexual
dilettante who also enchanted Henry James and a host of men and women-
Wharton turned to authors including Dante, Ronsard, and Nietzsche to
understand and convey her most personal sentiments. Her diary therefore often
reads like a commonplace book, but Wharton's looking outside of herself to
grasp her most private feelings is only superficially paradoxical, for her most
deeply felt emotions stemmed from literature. She constructed her personality
and her ideas about intimate relationships in large part through reading and
projected the myriad expressions of love she cherished in literature onto
Fullerton. In turning her lover into an imaginative possession, Wharton
recorded in her Love Diary not so much her relationship with Fullerton as her
relationship with his influence on her. She cited other authors both because
they informed her thoughts about love and because literature allowed her to
rewrite her lover as a character in one of the texts she admired. By experiencing
Fullerton's presence as textual, she was able to absorb it, much as she absorbed
literary works, and this heightened her sense of intimacy as a part of herself.
Even as it documents her absorption of Fullerton, her diary underscores the
complexities of interpersonally constructing the self. Wharton describes the
relationship as an intimate communion that expands her private personality, but
she also worries that her overwhelming love is blotting out her individuality
and that she has no self beyond the affair: "[T]he personality I had moulded
150. Id. at 169.
151. See Kenneth M. Price & Phyllis McBride, "The Life Apart ". Text and Contexts of Edith
Wharton's Love Diary, 66 AMERICAN LITERATuRE 663 (1994).
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into such strong firm lines has crumbled to a pinch of ashes in this flame!"
15 2
Her diary registers her ambivalent recognition that her affair at once promises
to enhance her personality and threatens to destroy it.
Often, Wharton's feelings of ecstatic communion and loss of self are
indistinguishable, for her personality is enhanced at the very moment she
documents its effacement. She writes, "[n]othing else lives in me now but
you-I have no conscious existence outside the thought of you, the feeling of
you. I, who dominated life, stood aside from it so, how I am humbled,
absorbed, without a shred of will or identity left!",153  This reads as a
complaint-her personality has come to rest so entirely in the relationship that
she is bereft of identity. Yet the very energy of the writing, not to mention her
use of an exclamation point, implies a degree of excitement about losing her
unique personality in an amorous fusion. In part, it seems, her excitement stems
from her emulation of literary texts; because she thrives on injecting her
newfound sentiments into earlier literary paradigms, she can relish even the
abjection love inspires. In this sense, her diary is a record of her love affair with
a love affair, or even her love affair with writing about a love affair.
Her ironic rapture, however, also reflects something internal to the affair
and to her own act of writing. It is at the pressured moments of the relationship,
when Wharton feels at risk of losing herself, that she paradoxically gains a
more robust private personality, and writing is the mechanism that negotiates
this transition. Publishing her loss of identity facilitates an ecstatic communion
with herself and forges a personality that inheres in this self-representation. In
other words, by documenting the erasure of her personality, writing ironically
functions as an act of self-possession that inscribes her ownership of a unique
private self. Her personality depends on a dramatic representation, which only
becomes possible because she feels her personality to be threatened.
This dramatic representation, moreover, depends on an audience, and
Wharton wrote the diary with a reader in mind. Apostrophizing Fullerton, she
declares in the first entry, "it is absurd to write down what one says to one's
self; but now I shall have the illusion that I am talking to you. ' 154 She never
names her lover, but only refers to him in the second person, as if the important
thing is to be speaking to someone. Indeed, her comment implies that she is
writing for her own benefit (though she ultimately did show Fullerton the
diary), but that she must cast her communion with self necessarily as a
communication between self and other. There is therefore an inherent
theatricality to the journal. In a sort of literary version of the self-objectification
that defines Lily and Undine, Wharton's articulation of her personality depends
on an internalized audience that is always already there. It matters little whether
152. Id. at 674.
153. Id. at 673.
154. Id. at 670.
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it becomes an actual audience or remains only an "illusion," for Wharton's
performance of her personality is ultimately self-directed.
B. Publishing the Self
The delicate balance of gaining a private personality through potential
effacement defined not only Wharton's relationship with Fullerton, but much of
her literary career, and publishing fiction allowed her to fashion a personal
identity in a still more public space than her diary. It is not, of course,
surprising that writing was indispensable to Wharton's sense of self. She often
described her novels and stories as reflections of her soul, which was
burgeoning through the very process of writing. She mentions, for instance,
"the soul of the novel, which is (or should be) the writer's own soul,' 5 5 and,
speaking through Vance Weston, underscores the private character of literary
works: "[A]n artist's work was essentially a part of the private life, something
closer than the marrow to the bone.'56 More generally, the vivid experience of
letters as more personal than their author is a recurring theme in Wharton's
fiction; it is as if one's private personality forms itself through writing rather
than lived experience. Mrs. Aubyn's letters in The Touchstone, for example,
"oddly enough, seemed.., to bring her nearer [to Glennard] than her
presence.'57
What is surprising, however, is that Wharton credited publishing, rather
than writing, with the creation of her personality. If her private self was forged
through and expressed in her fiction, it is unclear why publishing would
constitute her private identity rather than threaten it with exposure. But, she
insists in A Backward Glance, she only "acquire[d]" a "real personality of [her]
own" when she published her first volume of stories, 58 a book she also credits
with calling her soul to life. 59 As Wharton's curious statements suggest,
publishing was not a catalyst for recognizing a hidden personality-she did not
discover a preexisting self, even one created by writing, upon the circulation of
her volumes. Rather, publishing itself created her personality. As was true in
her relationship with Fullerton, it seems, the development of Wharton's
155. WHARTON, THE WRITING OF FICTION, supra note 146, at 115.
156. WHARTON, HUDSON RIVER BRACKETED, supra note 147, at 246.
157. Wharton, The Touchstone, supra note 1, at 358. Other examples abound. In The Letters,
Deering's communications lend Lizzie "sensations even more complex and delicate than Deering's
actual presence had ever occasioned." Edith Wharton, The Letters, 80 CENTURY MAGAZINE 485, 492
(1910). So too, Mattie's note to Ethan Frome and his "possession of the paper [gives] him a strange new
sense of her nearness." EDITH WHARTON, ETHAN FROME, in EDITH WHARTON: NOVELLAS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 129 (Cynthia Griffin Wolff ed., 1990) (1911). In The Custom of the Country, Undine's
letters to Ralph from Paris similarly serve as physical representations of her-aesthetically pleasing but
largely devoid of content; and Ralph regards holding the sheets of paper as holding his wife's hand.
WHARTON, supra note 116, at 192.
158. WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE, supra note 148, at 112.
159. Id. at 119.
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personality inhered in a dynamic of exposure and creation. Precisely because it
threatened violation, publishing lent her a sense of a private self.
To understand how exposure constructed Wharton's private personality, it
is helpful to examine her own accounts of writing and publishing. From her
early days of "making up" in her mother's bedroom, Wharton's creativity
hinged on a fragile union of privacy and publicity. In A Backward Glance, as
well as her more robust autobiographical fragment Life and 1,160 she describes
how she needed privacy to create and would sneak away, even from visiting
friends, to engage in her ecstatic process of storytelling. At the same time, she
needed an audience. Her description of "making up" underscores this balance
of solitude and surveillance, for she notes "(I always had to be alone to 'make
up')" only after she has registered the "[p]arents and nurses, peeping at me
through the cracks of doors."'161 Her very privacy appears to depend on her
knowledge that she is being watched. The parenthetical appearance of her
seclusion nestles it within observation and visually represents the publicity that
invariably enclosed Wharton's sense of privacy. By subjecting herself to an
audience, she was able to conceive of a private self.
When Wharton did not have an audience, moreover, she became her own.
Like Undine, who dresses up for her own eyes and parades before a mirror,
imitating laughter and conversation, Wharton from a very early age read and
responded to her own fiction. She wrote unrelenting reviews of her first book,
Fast and Loose, comparing the author to a sick, sentimental schoolgirl and
declaring, "every character is a failure, the plot a vacuum, the style spiritless,
the dialogue vague, the sentiment weak and the whole thing a fiasco. ' 62 This
fake review is not merely modest self-deprecation or evidence of Wharton's
desire to distinguish herself from sentimental female novelists. It also intimates
that her writing, even when directed only to herself, was always a performance
and that the consideration of publicity was inherent in the project of writing
from the outset.
Wharton's literary self-objectification extended not only to her diary, but
also to her professional career. In A Backward Glance, she proposes to offer
her reader a glimpse of the writer at work. She notes that "so few writers seem
to have watched themselves while they wrote,' 63 and thereby suggests that she
is an exception, that her consciousness is divided into actor and scrutinizing
observer. The chapter that documents her literary practices, however, seems to
indicate the limitations of regarding one's actions as if one were a detached
outside observer, for Wharton never does fully explain her writing process. She
160. Edith Wharton, Life and I, in EDITH WHARTON: NOVELLAS AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note
157, at 1069.
161. WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE, supra note 148, at 34.
162. See LEWIS, supra note 130, at 31 (quoting Wharton).
163. WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE, supra note 148, at 197-98.
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leads us to a "secret region on the sheer edge of consciousness,"' 64 teasing us
with the promise of revelation. Yet she quickly turns our attention away, to her
encounters with friends and neighbors, and frustrates our ability to peer into her
inner mind. 1
65
Rather than reflect her own lack of access to her writing process, this
sudden turn exemplifies Wharton's narrative method in her autobiography and
Love Diary-she gestures to a wealth of private information she will share but
then shifts our attention and keeps us skimming the surface. There are gaps at
the most significant moments of both texts. What is important is that Wharton
does not simply omit information, but rather points out that she is omitting
information. As her description of her writing process illustrates, she hints at a
space beyond the narrative in which privacy exists, but the very construction of
this space depends on her public claim to an imagined reader.
It would appear, then, that Wharton creates a private space beyond her
texts that inheres in outlining it for her readers, but not probing it. Her public
gesturing to privacy, by threatening it, paradoxically constructs it; and self-
creation becomes the outcome of perilously close self-exposure, much as the
parents and nurses peeping at Wharton underscored her privacy. In her early
architectural work, The Decoration of Houses, Wharton expresses a similar
conception of personality formed on the border of revelation and concealment.
She insists that decoration should "express the individuality of the occupant by
externalizing the self onto surrounding objects, without entrapping the self.',
166
Individuality is only fully realized when externalized, but such externalization
must be a theatrical gesture, a sort of dramatized self-possession, rather than
sheer exposure. By hinting at a private self that is related to and yet kept apart
from the self mirrored in such decoration, the house's occupant can create a
private identity through publication that suggests what is not being published.
Ultimately, therefore, Wharton's public claims of privacy do not point to
an autonomous, preexisting private identity but rather forge such an identity.
An audience is necessary to foster her sense that she has a private life. Her life-
writings not only complicate but invert Warren and Brandeis's legal
formulations of privacy and personality. If for them, the "right to one's
personality" inheres in "the immunity of the person,"'' 67 for her, it inheres in the
vulnerability and interdependence of the person. Her self-construction depends
on having her personality both engaged within intimate relationships and
potentially invaded by an audience. Meaningful privacy can only be realized in
the context of publicity, for subjectivity emerges not through being let alone,
but rather through subjecting the self to others.
164. Id. at 205.
165. See FRYER, supra note 127, at 156.
166. Kaplan, supra note 108, at 443.
167. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 207.
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V. BETWEEN THE LINES: WHARTON AND HER READER
The fragile dynamic of privacy and publicity that informed Wharton's
personality also structures her relationship with the reader of her fiction. As in
her autobiographical writings, she carves out a private space by explicitly
denying us access to certain information. Yet she also fosters an intimate
relationship with her reader, whom she engages as a co-creator of both
characters' consciousnesses and the novel itself. Wharton therefore establishes
two competing roles for her reader-the invading would-be voyeur and the
intimate parter-that are never fully reconciled, but rather continually vie for
priority. Readers are necessary to the construction of privacy within Wharton's
fiction, it appears, both because we are a threatening public that privacy can be
formed in opposition to and because we are a private circle that constructs an
interdependent text.
A. Threatening Readers and Veiled Disclosures: Protecting Textual Privacy
Wharton's ambivalent relationship with her reader seems to underlie her
complicated treatment of private information in many of her novels. She goes
to great lengths to protect it in certain instances yet relishes sharing it in others.
In The Touchstone, for instance, she does not show us Mrs. Aubyn's letters,
which are the very heart of the story. By refusing to participate in Glennard's
publication, she underscores the sordidness of his act and aligns us with the
greedy public within the text. Presumably, to show us the letters would be to
further violate Mrs. Aubyn's privacy. If Wharton protects Mrs. Aubyn's
epistolary sentiments, however, she allows us a privileged view of Glennard's
mind, and such access to her protagonist's inmost thoughts implicitly
differentiates our sympathetic reading from that of the novella's public.
Presenting personal information to us, it seems, need not violate characters'
privacy.
Wharton again prevents us from reading private letters in The House of
Mirth and The Custom of the Country and thereby associates us with the
novels' voyeuristic publics, and herself with Lily, who destroys Bertha's letters
without reading them. Wharton also derides newspapers' invasions of
characters' private lives, but her attempts to differentiate her literary project
from journalism suggest an uncomfortable likeness. Her novels may "beat the
society pages at their own game by telling the real truth behind the gossip.
'4 68
Indeed, The House of Mirth's initial wrapper proclaimed, "for the first time the
veil has been lifted from New York society."' 169 Although Wharton demanded
the removal of this phrase, the revelation it advertises resonates within her
168. Kaplan, supra note 108, at 451.
169. LEwIS, supra note 130, at 151 (quoting The House of Mirth's wrapper).
2004]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
novels, and she described training "the most searching gaze"' 17 on New York's
high society. Dabham may write a damning story in his Riviera Notes, but only
we know the "real truth" of what happened between Lily and Bertha. Likewise,
Selden may imagine that he sees Lily as she looks when she is alone, but it is
only readers who have such an intimate view.
Ironically, the very intensity of the novel's stare may differentiate it from
the press in a way that limits the harm of its probing. Jeffrey Rosen has argued
that the injury inflicted by invasions of privacy is that of being "misdefined and
judged out of context in a world of short attention spans," a world in which
people lack the background knowledge to adequately understand discrete bits
of information about others.' 71 Wharton embeds a similar claim in her novels,
for the public's most harmful invasions reflect not so much its access to private
information as its lack of access to complete information. If Selden, or even the
New York newspapers, knew Lily's story in the comprehensive way that the
novel's readers do, their scrutiny would be less violating.
Recognizing this paradoxical approach to self-protection, Wharton left
abundant private records for posterity so that she would be understood in
context. In addition to her Love Diary, she bequeathed many personal letters, a
fragment of the unpublished pornographic novella Beatrice Palmato, a diary
she began in the 1920s, and a packet labeled "For My Biographer." Aware that
she would be closely studied, she wanted to make sure we would "find the gist"
of her. 172 Nonetheless, she destroyed most of her intimate correspondence with
Walter Berry and repeatedly asked Fullerton to return her letters, though, like
Glennard, he ultimately sold his lover's correspondence. 173 Wharton's
negotiation of privacy with regard to posterity, then, simultaneously manifests
as a desire to reveal her "true" self and a desire to conceal her "true" self.
Moreover, her autobiographical revelations complicate the idea of a private self
that exists beyond public engagement, for her privacy depends on publicly
announcing it.
In her fiction, Wharton similarly takes readers to the brink of exposure and
then gestures to information that we cannot access. As illustrated by her
concealment of letters in The Touchstone and The House of Mirth, she almost
170. WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE, supra note 148, at 206.
171. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8
(2000).
172. LEWIS, supra note 130, at xii (quoting Wharton).
173. When reading Wharton's often abject letters to Fullerton, we therefore may feel, like Mrs.
Touchett, that we are listening at a keyhole; while we believe Fullerton is a scoundrel for not returning
or destroying his lover's letters, we gladly consume the fruits of his transgression. It remains possible,
however, that Wharton did not so much wish to destroy the letters as to control the conditions of their
publication. She wrote to Fullerton that the letters were "of no value to your archives, but.., fill a
deplorable lacuna in those of their writer," and thereby suggested that, like Mrs. Dale, she might
purposefully include this personal correspondence in her archives. Letter from Edith Wharton to
Morton Fullerton (Dec. 19, 1908), in THE LETTERS OF EDITH WHARTON 170 (R.W.B. Lewis & Nancy
Lewis eds., 1988).
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compulsively declares that there is a private space "beyond" the novel's pages.
We also never learn, for instance, what word Lily and Selden want to say to
each other in the final pages of The House of Mirth (or even whether there is
one word or two). In a Victorian novel, this unspoken word might offer a happy
ending despite the heroine's death, but Wharton denies her reader such a neat
conclusion. Her withholding of information underscore privacy's dependence
on the threat we pose as a mass audience. Privacy does not exist prior to the
possibility of exposure, but instead inheres in her very announcements to us
that we are being kept out.
As in her autobiographical writings, it seems, an audience is necessary to
the creation of privacy in Wharton's novels because of the publicity it
threatens. Wharton takes her critique of the fiction-reader even further by
expressing disdain for the reading public. She writes in A Backward Glance,
"[i]t is discouraging to know that the books into the making of which so much
of one's soul has entered will be snatched at by readers curious only to discover
which of the heroes and heroines of the 'society column' are to be found in
it."' 174 In a letter to Fullerton, her reaction against the reader becomes visceral
as she follows "the poor written word.., on its peregrinations through heaven
knows what indifferent hands, & under what derisive eyes, to its last rest in a
gutter or a rag-picker's bag-worse still, in an autograph album!'
175
This effusive indictment of readers, replete with snowballing climax and
exclamation point, recalls Wharton's description of the media's invasion of
Ralph Marvell's privacy in The Custom of the Country, as well as her
documentation of her own abjection in the Love Diary. Much as she
ecstatically recorded her loss of identity so as to forge an identity, in her letter
to Fullerton she seems delightedly disgusted by the imagined reader's
insensitive and devouring publicity because it enables her to define her own
authorship by contrast. Wharton negotiated her public authorship in part, that
is, by denouncing the very market that sustained it. She rejected debasing
readings by readers and critics and formed a critical self "within the breast
176
that registered her unique appreciation of texts and dialectically asserted a
private identity amidst mass consumption.177 She celebrated derisive publicity
precisely because she could bemoan it. By refusing to self-objectify as a
commodity, she fashioned a private authorial identity.
Notably, Warren and Brandeis also decry the process by which an author's
personal sentiments appear in an autograph album. Invoking writers'
prepublication rights, they argue that publishing a work without the author's
174. WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE, supra note 148, at 212.
175. Price & McBride, supra note 151, at 667-68 (quoting a letter from Wharton to Morton
Fullerton).
176. WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE, supra note 148, at 212.
177. See MARGIT STANGE, PERSONAL PROPERTY: WIVES, WHITE SLAVES, AND THE MARKET IN
WOMEN 39-40 (1998).
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consent violates privacy because it converts an expression of the creator's
personality into alienated property.' 78 Wharton's comment to Fullerton,
gleefully exaggerated as it may be, indicates that she, too, worried about
readers appropriating and commodifying her writings. Unlike the authors
Warren and Brandeis discuss, however, Wharton chose to publish her works,
and the property value of her books-as items that "[a]ny one walking along
the streets might go into any bookshop" and buy'79--was fundamentally
important to her identity as a professional author.
Wharton's anxiety about the reader's commodification instead concerns a
different kind of appropriation, which Warren and Brandeis do not engage in
their argument but which captured Wharton's attention. Someone can possess a
literary work either by owning its copyright and exercising property rights over
it (or by exercising such rights in the absence of copyright ownership, as in the
cases Warren and Brandeis discuss), or by imaginatively appropriating it.' 80 In
her autobiography, Wharton temporarily conflates these two kinds of
possession but underscores her concern with the latter: "If one has.., sold
one's wares in the open market, one has sold to the purchasers the right to think
what they choose about one's books.'' Wharton's expansive sense of privacy,
which hinges on the needs of the interdependent self rather than the right to be
left alone, suggests why she would be acutely sensitivity to readers' thoughts
about her books. Much as she herself absorbed other literary works, readers
imaginatively possess Wharton's fiction. There are, of course, different ways to
do so, and her complaints about the literary marketplace imply that she scorned
the appropriation of a particular kind of audience-superficially curious and
derisive gossipers-but welcomed readers who would instead be invested and
sympathetic partners.
B. An Ambivalent Welcome: Literary Intimacy
For Wharton, the threat of publishing for readers who would indifferently
treat her works as commodities was always accompanied by the possibility of
literary intimacy, and her denunciation of her audience ambivalently coexists
with appeals to us to serve as intimate co-creators of her novels. Her most
178. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 198-200.
179. WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE, supra note 148, at 113.
180. See, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 10, at 79. The distinction between idea and expression has long
been central to Anglo-American copyright law. Readers may not use the author's expressions as their
own, but they are welcome to appropriate the ideas within books. As Martha Woodmansee has noted,
Johann Gottlieb Fichte wrote in the late eighteenth century that while the material book belongs to the
reader upon purchase and the form in which ideas are presented remains the property of the author, the
ideas themselves become the common property of author and reader. See MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE
AUTHOR, ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 51 (1994). See also
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 143-45 (1993) (exploring how
the distinction in copyright law between idea and expression might relate to privacy).
181. WHARTON, A BACKWARD GLANCE, supra note 148, at 212.
[Vol. 16:41
Edith Wharton, Privacy, and Publicity
damning indictment, which appears in the aptly titled Vice of Reading, also
serves as her greatest tribute to the reader's participation. She criticizes
mechanical readers who do not engage their inner selves and therefore fail to
alter the book in their absorption of it. "What is reading, in the last analysis,"
she questions, "but an interchange of thought between writer and reader?'
182
The gravest offense a reader can commit, she insists, is to lack a "point of
contact with the author's mind."' 83 If Wharton worries that her audience will
read to its own ends and change her texts in a way she does not condone (e.g.,
picking out "society column" regulars), she also fears that it will not be
invested enough in her works to transform them. The key to reconciling these
positions, it would appear, is intimacy-we must reshape the texts through the
close relationship we develop with them and their creator.
Even as Wharton gestures to spaces in her novels we are seemingly
excluded from, she invites us to construct characters' consciousnesses and
information that lies beyond the novels' pages. If we invest ourselves in her
fiction, she intimates, we can imaginatively appropriate it in a way that enables
the story and characters to inhabit our minds as well as hers. While her
autobiographical writings forge a private self that depends on our imagined
presence but ultimately keeps us at a distance, her fictional works include us in
the construction of privacy even as they resist certain kinds of participation. As
she wrote in the introduction to her ghost stories, "I was conscious of a
common medium between myself and my readers, of their meeting me half
way among primeval shadows, and filling in the gaps in my narrative with
sensations and divinations akin to my own.',184 Although the primeval shadows
are the unique province of ghost stories, this quote is deeply informative about
all of Wharton's fiction. The gaps in her narrative can signal resistance to the
reader, but they can also signal a privacy that is meant to be "filled in" by our
sensations, commingling with her own. The narrator of Ethan Frome tells us, "I
had the sense that the deeper meaning of the story was in the gaps."'8 5 This is
generally true in Wharton's stories-she guides us to the gaps and then, while
telling us we cannot proceed any further, demands our active participation to
imbue her fiction with meaning.
This ambivalent welcome applies particularly to Wharton's delineation of
characters' consciousnesses, for she seems to protect her characters' privacy
through both concealment and the mutual construction of a character's
personality by author and reader. Discussing The House of Mirth, Ruth Bernard
Yeazell argues that Wharton "takes advantage of the possibilities of fiction:
insisting that in Lily Bart's world only appearances count, she nonetheless
182. Edith Wharton, The Vice of Reading, 177 N. AM. REV. 513, 513 (1903).
183. Id. at 516.
184. See CANDACE WAID, EDITH WHARTON'S LETTERS FROM THE UNDERWORLD: FICTIONS OF
WOMEN AND WRITING 176 (1991) (quoting Wharton).
185. WHARTON, ETHAN FROME, supra note 157, at 65.
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offers us an interior view, the privileged access to another's consciousness that
only fiction can provide.' ' 6 Taking issue with this claim, William Moddelinog
maintains that the novel highlights an "illegible element at the core of Lily's
self' and refuses to expose her "to the unimpeded gaze" of readers. 187 Both of
these arguments, I believe, overlook a fundamental aspect of the reader's
relationship to The House of Mirth. Wharton neither freely provides access to
Lily's consciousness nor entirely withholds it, because, she suggests, in this
novel Lily's consciousness is not autonomous, but rather the outcome of the
reader's careful engagement with the text.
At pivotal moments in the novel, Wharton purposefully renders her
protagonist's motivations opaque. Noting this, Moddelmog insists that Wharton
keeps Lily's intentions in burning Bertha's letters indecipherable in order to
valorize Lily's private decision. 188 While this is an attractive way to unite
character and author, I believe it is a flawed interpretation. Wharton does not
dramatize all of Lily's thoughts and emotions in this moment, but she has
fostered our intimacy with Lily throughout the novel so that when we reach the
boundaries of explicit knowledge, our relationship allows us to enter the private
spaces of her mind. Much as Lily realizes that her personality flows into and
out of the tender life of her friend's baby, we feel that our consciousnesses are
engaged in a dynamic exchange with Lily's. Wharton has insisted on
characters' "violate" personalities within her novels, but it is most emphatically
the fictional relationship of character and reader that entails the fluid interaction
of personalities. We cannot read Lily as an autonomous character; we must
read some of ourselves into her, and at the very moments when she is most
inscrutable, she is, therefore, in some ways most knowable.
Thus, when Wharton does not fully dramatize Lily's state of mind upon
burning Bertha's letters or upon taking chloral before her final night of sleep,
she is not valorizing her protagonist's private decision so much as eliciting our
private participation. The truth of Lily's life can be realized only through the
reader's contribution. This may well make "the real Lily Bart" a different
character for each reader; but, Wharton suggests, fiction should have a unique
existence in each reader's mind: "If the book enters the reader's mind just as it
left the writer's-without any of the additions and modifications inevitably
produced by contact with a new body of thought-it has been read to no
purpose."'
' 89
This appeal, like all of Wharton's overtures to her readers, is ultimately
self-protecting. If we approximate the negative models of reading she offers in
A Backward Glance and The Vice of Reading, she insists, our superficial
186. Ruth Bernard Yeazell, The Conspicuous Wasting of Lily Bart, 59 ELH 713, 731 (1992).
187. Moddelmog, supra note 84, at 339-40.
188. Id. at 355.
189. Wharton, The Vice of Reading, supra note 182, at 513.
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engagement will ensure that we are forever barred from the text's privacy. If,
instead, we dedicate ourselves so that our own privacy is at stake, we can
surmount the barriers she erects. To truly grasp Wharton's fiction, we must
invest ourselves, so that the novel's privacy becomes a matter of mutual
understanding. Even as we shape her texts through our engagement, we shape
our own minds, for the inverse of her claim is also true. If the reader's mind
remains unaltered after engaging a book, the book has been read to no purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Wharton's literary and autobiographical writings challenge the
legal definitions of privacy that Warren and Brandeis advance in The Right to
Privacy, definitions that became increasingly embedded in American law in the
later years of Wharton's life. While Warren and Brandeis argue that the
individual's independent personality must be protected through being let alone,
Wharton insists that personalities are necessarily interdependent and that
privacy is always bound up in publicity. For her, the female personality in
particular relies on other people, whether through the process of self-
objectification or the more affirming give-and-take of intimate relationships.
Both the heroines of her novels and the female novelist-Wharton herself-
forge their personalities in conjunction with others and value privacy only to
the extent that it incorporates publicity. Intimacy and performance are more
central to women's experience of privacy, Wharton insists, than being let alone.
The right to privacy advanced by Warren and Brandeis therefore inadequately
addresses women's needs.
Over the course of the twentieth century, many legal theorists and
philosophers have explored the complications of privacy, including its
interpersonal dimensions. Privacy is essential to development of human
relationships, these scholars argue, and an important end of protecting privacy
is facilitating intimacy; different degrees of self-revelation define our various
relationships, and privacy allows us to determine the level of intimacy in each
relationship. 190 While Wharton's works do not directly address legal theories of
190. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL
CHOICE 142 (1970) (arguing that "[i]ntimacy is the sharing of information about one's actions, beliefs or
emotions which one does not share with all, and which one has the right not to share with anyone," and
that "[b]y conferring this right, privacy creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and
love"); Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 265, 265
(Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (insisting that "intimate relationships simply could not exist if
we did not continue to insist on privacy for them"); JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND
ISOLATION 56 (1992) (maintaining that three "apparently disparate areas [of privacy] are linked by the
common denominator of intimacy-privacy's content covers intimate information, access, and
decisions"); ROSEN, supra note 171, at 8 (claiming that "the intimate relationships on which true
knowledge of another person depends need space as well as time [to flourish]: sanctuaries from the gaze
of the crowd in which slow mutual self-disclosure is possible"). But see JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN
PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 75-77 (1997); Jeffrey H. Reiman,
2004]
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privacy-as-intimacy, they nonetheless have something to contribute to this
discussion. These theorists predominantly contend that privacy must precede
intimacy in order to facilitate individual choices about sharing personal
information. Wharton inverts their terms and suggests that it is not privacy that
facilitates intimacy so much as intimate relationships that facilitate private self-
creation. For her, personality does not exist outside of the context of
interpersonal relationships-be they intimate relations or simply the awareness
in an individual's mind of the audience to which she presents herself.
Furthermore, whereas contemporary scholars by and large treat the connection
between privacy and intimacy as positive, Wharton insists that the individual's
dependence on others can both affirm and diminish the self. She enriches our
understanding of the complexity of personality, privacy, and publicity precisely
because she resists drawing firm conclusions.
This is why, I believe, Wharton's novels not only make for good reading
but also lend us valuable insights into privacy. Her contribution is not expressly
legal, and, if anything, she makes the question of the individual's personality
and privacy more tangled by arguing that privacy must always be considered in
terms of publicity and relationships, and that this can have both positive and
negative repercussions. But this, however paradoxical, is her contribution.
Literature has room for ambiguities that the law cannot always accommodate,
and Wharton's writings productively engage the tension between individual
privacy and intimacy, between public theatricality that stunts the development
of interiority and public theatricality that can create a private self. What her
novels give us, ultimately, is not a definition of privacy or a program for
judicial rulings, but rather a more nuanced understanding of the issues. Her
complicated portrayals of privacy increase our sensitivity, so that after reading
her works we bring an enhanced perspective to some thorny legal debates.
Wharton's works continue to resonate today, and they challenge us to think
more expansively about privacy nearly one hundred years after the publication
of The House of Mirth.
Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY, at 300, 314; Daniel J.
Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1122-24 (2002).
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